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THE  INTERACTION  OF EXPECTED INFLATION and  nominal  rates  of interest 
is a topic that has received  its share  of attention  since Milton Friedman 
gave  Irving  Fisher's  theory  a prominent  role in his presidential  address  to 
the American  Economic  Association  in 1967.1  The relationship  between 
interest  and expected  inflation  depends  intricately  on the interactions  of 
the real and financial  sectors  of the economy,  so that the subject  of this 
paper  lies in the domain  of macroeconomic  analysis.  Partial  equilibrium 
analysis  won't  do. Therefore,  even  though  my main  subject  is the relation- 
ship  between  interest  rates  and  expected  inflation,  there  is no way  to avoid 
such matters  as the nature  of the Phillips  curve,  the way expectations  are 
formed,  and,  in some  formulations,  the sizes  of various  interest  elasticities: 
those of the demand  and  supply  for money  and  those of aggregate  demand 
and  its components. 
Note: The research  underlying  this paper  was financed  by the Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of Minneapolis,  and earlier  research  that was an indirect  input was supported  by the 
National Bureau  of Economic  Research.  Neither  institution  is responsible  for the paper's 
conclusions.  I benefited  from  discussions  with  Neil Wallace,  Arthur  Rolnick,  Christopher 
A. Sims, and members  of the Brookings  panel, none of whom, however,  can be held 
responsible  for any errors.  Thomas  Turner  provided  valuable  help with the calculations. 
1. Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," American  Economic  Review, 
Vol. 58 (March  1968),  pp. 1-17. One statement  of Fisher's  theory  can be found in Irving 
Fisher. The Theory  of Interest  (MacMillan,  1930),  pp. 399-451. 
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Thus, consider  Irving  Fisher's  theory. In one interpretation,  it asserts 
that an exogenous  increase  in the rate of inflation  expected  to persist  over 
a given  horizon  will produce  an equivalent  jump in the nominal  yield on 
bonds  of the corresponding  maturity.  That assertion  concerns  the way the 
whole  economy  is put together;  in particular,  it is about  the reduced  form 
equations  for nominal  rates  of interest.  If it is to hold, various  restrictions 
must  be imposed  on the parameters  of the structural  equations  of a macro- 
economic  model,  which  in turn  imply  important  restrictions  on the reduced 
form equations  for endogenous  variables  besides the interest  rate-for 
example,  aggregate  income and prices, variables  that properly  concern 
policy  makers  more  than do nominal  interest  rates.  For example,  in stan- 
dard  IS-LM-Phillips  curve  models,2  the response  of the interest  rate  to an 
exogenous  shock in expected  inflation,  like the response  to any other 
shock that affects  aggregate  demand,  is distributed  over time.3  A once- 
and-for-all  jump in expected  inflation  eventually  leaves the real rate of 
interest  unaltered,  but  in the short  run  drives  it down  and  output  Up.4  Only 
in the special  case in which  the LM curve  is vertical,  the IS curve  is hori- 
zontal, or the short-run  Phillips  curve  is vertical  (price  adjustments  being 
instantaneous  whenever  employment  threatens  to deviate from full em- 
ployment)  does an increase  in expected  inflation  produce  an immediate, 
equivalent  jump in the nominal  interest  rate.5  These special sets of pa- 
rameter  values obviously  impart a very monetarist  or classical  sort of 
behavior  to the model. 
On this interpretation  of Fisher's  theory,  all of the parameters  influenc- 
ing the slopes  of the IS, LM, and  Phillips  curves  are  pertinent  in evaluating 
its adequacy.  Conversely,  evidence  that  the  theory  seems  adequate  contains 
indirect  implications  about the parameters  of the macroeconomic  struc- 
ture, and therefore  might have some clues relevant  for evaluating  the 
relative  efficacy  of monetary  and fiscal  policies. 
2. See, for example,  Martin  Bailey, National  Income  and the  Price Level: A Study  in 
Macrothieory  (McGraw-Hill,  1962),  especially  pp. 49-54, which  contains  a good exposi- 
tion of Fisher's  theory  from the standpoint  of the standard  macroeconomic  model. 
3. This point has been made  by Edward  J. Kane, among  others.  See "The  Rasche  and 
Andersen  Papers,  A Comment  by Edward  J. Kane,"  Journal  of Money,  Credit  and  Bank- 
ing, Vol. 5 (February  1973),  Pt. 1, pp. 39-42. 
4. Some of Keynes'  views about the effect of an increase  in expected  inflation  on in- 
terest and employment  are contained  in John Maynard  Keynes, The General  Theory  of 
Employment,  Interest  and Money  (Harcourt,  Brace, 1936),  pp. 141-43. 
5. For example,  see Thomas  J. Sargent,  "Anticipated  Inflation  and the Nominal Rate 
of Interest,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol. 86 (May 1972),  pp. 212-25. Thomas  J. Sargent  431 
While  the preceding  statement  of Fisher's  theory  may be of interest  in 
highlighting  its macroeconomic  content,  the theory can be stated in an 
alternative  and less confining  form, which  probably  comes  closer  to what 
modern  adherents  to Fisher's  doctrine  have  in mind.  This statement  is less 
confining  because  its truth  does not require  any restrictions  on the magni- 
tudes of the slopes  of the IS, LM, and short-run  Phillips  curves.  Further- 
more,  it does not involve  pursuing  the implications  of an exogenous  jump 
in expected  inflation.  Instead,  expectations  of inflation  are assumed  to be 
endogenous  to the system  in a very  particular  way:  they are  assumed  to be 
"rational"  in Muth's  sense6-which  is to say that the public's  expectations 
are not systematically  worse than the predictions  of economic  models. 
This amounts  to supposing  that the public's  expectations  depend,  in the 
proper  way,  on the things  that  economic  theory  says  they  ought  to. Beyond 
this, the alternative  statement  of Fisher's  theory  assumes  that the Phelps- 
Friedman  hypothesis  of a natural  rate of unemployment  is true, and thus 
that no (systematic)  monetary  or fiscal  policies  can produce  a permanent 
effect  on the unemployment  rate.7  Given  these  two hypotheses  (which  are 
related  to one another,  since it seems  impossible  to give the natural  rate 
hypothesis  a proper  formal  statement  without  invoking  the hypothesis  of 
rationality),  it follows that the real rate of interest  is independent  of the 
systematic,  or foreseen,  part  of the money  supply,  which  therefore  can in- 
fluence  the nominal  rate  only through  effects  on expected  inflation. 
The notion that the real  rate  of interest  is independent  of the systematic 
part of the money  supply  embodies  the key aspect  of Fisher's  theory  ap- 
pealed  to by Friedman  in his presidential  address.  To obtain  this property 
for the real rate  requires  no assumptions  about  the slopes of the IS, LM, 
and short-run  Phillips  curves,  for rationality  and the natural  unemploy- 
ment  rate  hypothesis  are sufficient  to support  it. From this point of view, 
then,  the important  thing  is not the response  of the system  to an exogenous 
shift  in expected  inflation. 
It is important  to determine  the relationship  that the standard  way of 
empirically  implementing  Fisher's  theory  bears  to the preceding  statement 
6. John F.  Muth, "Rational Expectations  and the Theory of Price Movements," 
Econometrica,  Vol. 29 (July 1961), pp. 315-35. Some very important  implications of 
assuming  rationality  in Muth's  sense  in certain  kinds of models  of forward  markets  were 
pointed out by Paul A. Samuelson in his "Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices 
Fluctuate  Randomly,"  Industrial  Management  Review,  Vol. 6 (Spring  1965), pp. 41-49. 
7. See Edmund  S. Phelps,  Inflation  Policy  and Unemployment  Theory:  The  Cost-Benefit 
Approach  to Monetary  Planning  (W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 35-43. 432  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
of the theory.  Irving  Fisher  and most of his followers8  have implemented 
the theory  by estimating  a model  of the form 
=p  + 7r  +  ut 
n 
T=  w  wi  (pz  -Pts-1)3 
i=O 
where  rt  is the nominal  rate  of interest,  p is a constant,  7rt  is the unobserva- 
ble expected  rate  of inflation,  pt is the logarithm  of the price  level,  wi  and  n 
are parameters,  and ut is a random  error  assumed  to be distributed  in- 
dependently  of past, present,  and future  values  of p. These  two equations 
have typically  been combined  to yield  the equation 
n 
-=E  wi  (A-4  Pt-i-1)  + Ut +  P3 
i=O 
which  has been  estimated  by a variant  of the method  of least  squares.  The 
wis  have  been  interpreted  as estimates  of the distributed  lags by which  the 
public  forms  its expectations  of inflation.  (Some  of Fisher's  followers  have 
added  some regressors  in an effort  to improve  his equation.9) 
Generally  speaking,  the results  of estimating  this equation  have  reflected 
poorly on the model. For data extending  over very  long periods  of time, 
estimates  of the wis  depict  extraordinarily  long distributed  lags, much  too 
long to be useful in forming  predictions  of inflation.  Consequently,  the 
estimated  wis do not seem to provide  a plausible  description  of the way 
people  form  expectations  of inflation-at least  if they  do so in an informed 
way.'0  For this reason,  Fisher's  empirical  results  have often been viewed 
with suspicion." 
8. For example, see William E.  Gibson, "Price-Expectations  Effects on Interest 
Rates,"  Journal  of Finance,  Vol. 25 (March 1970),  pp. 19-34, and William  P. Yohe and 
Denis S. Karnosky, "Interest  Rates and Price Level Changes, 1952-69," Federal Re- 
serve Bank of St. Louis, Review,  Vol. 51 (December  1969), pp. 18-38. 
9. For example, see Martin Feldstein and Otto Eckstein, "The Fundamental  De- 
terminants  of the Interest  Rate," Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 52 (November 
1970), pp. 363-75. 
10. This point has been  made  by Phillip  Cagan  in Determinants  and  Effects  of Changes 
in the Stock of Money, 1875-1960  (Columbia  University  Press  for the National Bureau 
of Economic  Research,  1965), pp. 252-59. 
11. Nerlove has proposed  comparing  regressions  of dependent  variables  (like rt) on 
current  and lagged proxies for psychological  expectations  (like pt, pt-i,  .  .  .)  with the 
distributed  lags associated  with the optimal  forecast  of the variables  about which  expec- 
tations are being formed  (in this case inflation)  on the basis of the regressors.  See Marc 
Nerlove, "Distributed  Lags and Unobserved  Components  in Economic  Time Series,"  in Thomas  J. Sargent  433 
As it turns out, such negative  empirical  results  carry  no implications 
about  the validity  of the version  of Fisher's  theory  considered  here.  Even 
if the theory  is correct,  there  is in general  no reason  to expect  that regres- 
sions of nominal  interest  rates on current  and lagged rates of inflation 
should  give  distributed  lag functions  that  could  reasonably  be used  to form 
expectations  of inflation.  The theory  cannot  be tested  by running  regres- 
sions like Fisher's. 
This  paper  is organized  as follows.  The first  section  describes  a very  sim- 
ple and  fairly  standard  macroeconomic  model  within  which  to analyze  the 
relationship  between  interest  and inflation.  The second section takes a 
short detour  from the main theme of the paper  to analyze the interest- 
inflation  relationship  that obtains  when  expectations  of inflation  are gen- 
erated  by the standard  "adaptive"  mechanism,  the usual assumption  in 
empirical  work. Here I briefly  outline the restrictions  on the macroeco- 
nomic structure  necessary  to rationalize  the kind of procedure  used by 
Fisher  in his empirical  work.  Next comes a description  of the behavior  of 
the model embodying  "rational"  expectations;  I show that under this 
assumption,  the natural  unemployment  rate hypothesis  and a version  of 
Fisher's  theory  about  the interest  rate  and expected  inflation  form  a pack- 
age.  Proper  empirical  tests  of the  model  are  also discussed,  and  two of them 
are implemented.  As it turns  out, the most straightforward  way to test the 
model  is to test the natural  unemployment  rate  hypothesis. 
The argument  in this paper  is heavily  dependent  on the analysis  of the 
natural  rate hypothesis  carried  out by Lucas  in a series  of papers.  12 The 
William  Fellner  and others,  Ten  Economic  Studies  in the Tradition  of Irving  Fisher  (John 
Wiley, 1967).  An application  of such a comparison  to Fisher's  equation,  with the results 
confirming  Cagan's  doubts about the plausibility  of long lags, is contained  in my paper, 
"Interest  Rates and Prices  in the Long Run: A Study of the Gibson Paradox,"  Journal 
of Money, Credit  and Banking,  Vol. 5 (February  1973),  Pt. 2, pp. 385-449. 
12. Robert E. Lucas,  Jr., and Leonard  A. Rapping,  "Real Wages,  Employment,  and 
Inflation,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  Vol. 77 (September/October  1969),  pp. 721-54; 
Lucas, "Econometric  Testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis,"  in Otto Eckstein  (ed.), 
The  Econometrics  of Price Determination  Conference,  sponsored  by the Board of Gover- 
nors of the Federal  Reserve  System  and Social Science  Research  Council (FRB, 1972); 
Lucas, "Expectations  and the Neutrality  of Money,"  Journal  of Economic  Theory,  Vol. 4 
(April 1973), pp. 103-24; Lucas, "Some International  Evidence on Output-Inflation 
Tradeoffs,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 63 (June 1973),  pp. 326-34; Lucas, "Econ- 
ometric  Policy Evaluation:  A Critique,"  Journal  of Money, Credit  and Banking  (forth- 
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proposition  that the real  interest  rate  is independent  of the systematic  part 
of the money supply,  given  both rationality  and the natural  rate hypoth- 
esis,  follows  quite  directly  from  Lucas'  work.  In important  ways,  the struc- 
ture  of the argument  in this  paper  resembles  that  of Friedman's  presidential 
address,  in which  the close connection  between  the hypothesis  of a natural 
rate of unemployment  and Fisher's  theory  of the real rate of interest  was 
brought  out. 
A Simple  Macroeconomic  Model 
I assume  a macroeconomic  structure  that  can  be described  by the follow- 
ing equations: 
(1)  Aggregate  supply  schedule 
Yt  =t  +  'Y(Pt  -tPt  -0  +  Uo,  7>? 
(2)  Aggregate  demand  schedule,  or IS curve 
Yt  = kt  +  c[rt  -(t+lp  - Pt)] +  dZt  +  Et3  C  <  0; 
(3)  Portfolio  balance  schedule 
mt  =Pt+Yt+  brt  + 77t  b < O. 
Here  Yt'  Pt. and mt  are the natural  logarithms  of real national  income,  the 
price  level,  and  the exogenous  money  supply,  respectively;  rt  is the nominal 
rate of interest  itself (not its logarithm),  while  Zt  is a vector  of exogenous 
variables.  The parameters  c, y, and b are assumed  to be scalars,  while d 
is a vector  conformable  to Zt.13 The variables  Ut, et,  and qt  are mutualy 
uncorrelated,  normally  distributed  random  variables.  They  may  be serially 
correlated.  The variable  t+lP*  is the public's  psychological  expectation  as 
of time t of the logarithm  of the price level expected  to prevail  at time 
t +  1. The variable  kt  is a measure  of "normal"  productive  capacity,  such 
as the logarithm  of the stock  of labor  or of capital  or some  linear  combina- 
tion of the two; it is assumed  to be exogenous. 
13. All of the results  carry  through  if c and b are assumed  to be polynomials  in the lag 
operator,  so that the equations  in which they appear  involve distributed  lags. Also, al- 
most all of them  carry  through  if the random  terms  are permitted  to be correlated  across 
equations.  The only exceptions  occur where  the assumption  that they are uncorrelated 
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Equation  (1) is an aggregate  supply  schedule  relating  the deviation  of 
output from normal  productive  capacity  directly  to the gap between  the 
current  price  level  and  the public's  prior  expectation  of it. Unexpected  rises 
in the price  level  thus  boost aggregate  supply,  because  suppliers  mistakenly 
interpret  surprise  increases  in the aggregate  price  level as increases  in the 
relative  prices  of the labor  or goods  they  are  supplying.  This  mistake  occurs 
because  suppliers  receive  information  about  the prices  of their  own goods 
faster  than they receive  information  about the aggregate  price  level. This 
is the kind  of aggregate  supply  schedule  that  Lucas  and  Rapping  have  used 
to explain  the inverse  correlation  between  observed  inflation  and unem- 
ployment  depicted  by the Phillips  curve.14 
Equation  (2) is an aggregate  demand  or IS schedule  showing  that the 
deviation  of aggregate  demand  from capacity  is inversely  related  to the 
real rate of interest,  which,  in turn, equals  the nominal  rate r, minus  the 
rate of inflation  expected  by the public,  t+lP  -Pt.  The rate  rt is assumed 
to be the yield to maturity  on a one-period  bond. Aggregate  demand  also 
depends  on a vector  of exogenous  variables,  Zt, which  includes  government 
expenditures  and tax rates.15 
Equation  (3) summarizes  the condition  for portfolio  balance.  Owners  of 
bonds and equities  (which  are assumed  to be viewed  as perfect  substitutes 
for one another)  are  satisfied  with the division  of their  portfolios  between 
money,  on the one hand,  and  bonds  and  equities,  on the other,  when  equa- 
tion (3) is satisfied.  Equation  (3) posits  that the demand  for real balances 
depends  directly  on real income and inversely  on the nominal rate of 
interest. 
To complete  the model  requires  an hypothesis  explaining  the formation 
of the public's  expectations  of the price level. Here the behavior  of the 
model  will be analyzed  under  two such  hypotheses:  first,  with  one particu- 
lar  kind  of ad hoc, extrapolative  expectations,  consistent  with  the formula- 
14. Lucas and Rapping,  "Real Wages,  Employment,  and Inflation." 
15. The results  would  apply  if c and d were  polynomials  in the lag operator;  choosing 
those polynomials  appropriately  would be equivalent  to putting  lagged  ys and ks in the 
aggregate  demand  schedule.  For these results,  an important  thing about equation (2) is 
that it excludes  as arguments  both the money supply  and the price  level, apart  from the 
latter's  appearance  as part of the real rate of interest.  This amounts  to ruling  out direct 
real balance  effects  on aggregate  demand.  It also amounts  to ignoring  the expected  rate 
of real capital gains on cash holdings as a component of the disposable  income terms 
that belong  in the expenditures  schedules  that underlie  equation  (2). Ignoring  these  things 
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tion adopted  in almost  all empirical  work  on the Fisher relationship;  and 
subsequently  with the  assumption  that the public's expectations are 
"rational." 
The Interest-Inflation  Relationship  under  "Adaptive"  Expectations 
To equations  (1), (2), and (3) I temporarily  add the hypothesis 
(4)  t+lPt  =EVi  Pt-iV*Pt 
where  the vis  are  a set of parameters.  Equation  (4) is an example  of the so- 
called "adaptive"  expectations  hypothesis  proposed  by Cagan  and Fried- 
man.16  Given  the exogenous  variables  mi, kt, and  Zt and  the random  terms 
Uo Et.  and q,, equations  (1) through  (4) form a system  that is capable  of 
determining  Yt,  Pt,  rt, and t+lPt 
To obtain  a version  of the equation  estimated  by Fisher,  substitute  the 
expectation  hypothesis  (4) into the aggregate  demand  schedule  (2), and 
solve for the nominal  rate of interest: 
(5)  r, =  V*Pt  -Pt  +  c-l  (Yt  -  kt) -  cl  dZt -c-  et. 
This equation  has a disturbance  term, -  c-  E,  which is simply a linear 
function  of the disturbance  in the aggregate  demand  schedule,  and so is 
in general  correlated  both with  p and with  y -  k. Because  of this correla- 
tion, single-equation  methods  like least squares  ought not to be expected 
to provide  reliable  estimates  of the parameters  of (5). In general,  random 
shocks to aggregate  demand  affect r, p, and y -  k, contributing  to the 
existence  of a relationship  between  r and  p quite  apart  from  any effects  of 
expected  inflation  on the interest  rate.  This  influence  poisons  the data  from 
the point  of view  of extracting  estimates  of the parameters  of (5) by single- 
equation  methods. 
However,  some  restrictions  can  be placed  on the parameters  of the  model 
so as to make  p and  y -  k independent  of current  and lagged  es, thus ra- 
tionalizing  the statistical  procedures  used by Fisher  and his followers.  In 
16. Phillip  Cagan,  "The  Monetary  Dynamics  of Hyperinflation,"  in Milton Friedman 
(ed.), Studies  in the Quantity  Theory  of Money  (University  of Chicago  Press,  1956);  Mil- 
ton Friedman,  A Theory  of the Consumption  Function  (Princeton  University  Press  for the 
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particular,  suppose  that  in the portfolio  balance  schedule,  b =  O,  so that  the 
demand  for money  is independent  of the nominal  rate  of interest.  It is also 
essential  that  kt,  the measure  of productive  capacity,  be exogenous  and  not 
dependent  on current  or past values  of either  the nominal  or the real rate 
of interest.  This requirement  amounts  to ruling  out effects  of the real rate 
of interest  on the rate of formation  of productive  capacity.  Given that 
b = 0, nominal  aggregate  output is determined  by the portfolio  balance 
schedule  (3), which  can be arranged  to read 
(6)  Pt  + Yt  =  mt-7lt. 
The division  of nominal  output  between  real output  and the price  level is 
then determined  by the aggregate  supply  schedule  (1) and  the expectations 
generator  (4): 
(7)  Yt  -  kt =  -ypt -  'yV*pt_  +  Ut. 
Equations  (6) and (7)  jointly  determine  p and  y, so that aggregate  demand 
plays  no role  in affecting  either  p or y -  k; that  is, the LM curve  is vertical, 
so that shifts  in the IS curve  have no effects  on output.  The interest  rate 
bears  the full burden  of equilibrating  the system  when  shocks  to aggregate 
demand  occur.  In such a system,  e is uncorrelated  with  both  p and  y -k, 
so that application  of least squares  to (5) can be expected  to produce 
statistically  consistent  estimates.  Note that  if k depends  on lagged  values  of 
the real rate of interest,  it also depends  on lagged values of E.  But then 
serial  correlation  of the Es  implies  that least  squares  estimates  of (5) are  not 
consistent,  even  if b = 0. Hence,  kt  must  be assumed  independent  of lagged 
real rates of interest  in order to rationalize  least squares  estimation  of 
equation  (5). 
But the problem  is more than a simple  matter  of statistical  technique. 
Unless b = 0, a jump in expected  inflation  is not fully reflected  immedi- 
ately in the nominal rate of interest. To see this, let (t+ip*  -  pt) in equa- 
tion (2) and p*-, in equation  (1) both be exogenous,  thus  abandoning  (4). 
Then  an exogenous  jump in (t+iP* -  Pt) has the readily  apparent  effect  of 
shifting  the IS curve  upward  in the r, (y -  k) plane  by exactly  the amount 
of the shift.  Unless b = 0, making  the LM curve  vertical,  the upward  shift 
in the IS curve  increases  r, but by less than the increase  in (t+lP*  -  Pt); 
y -  k also increases.  How much  of the adjustment  to a jump in expected 
inflation  is borne  by the nominal  interest  rate and how much  by real out- 
put depends  on the slopes of the IS curve,  the LM curve,  and the short- 438  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
run Phillips  curve.  The nominal  interest  rate  bears  more of the burden  of 
adjustment  the steeper  is the LM curve,  the flatter  is the IS curve,  and the 
more responsive  are prices  to output  in the short-run  Phillips  curve-that 
is, the steeper  is the short-run  Phillips  curve.'7 
In summary,  useful  estimates  of the parameters  of Fisher's  equation  (5) 
can be expected  only where  both b = 0 and kt is independent  of current 
and past real rates of interest.  The first restriction  is extremely  "mone- 
tarist"  in character,  implying  a "quantity  theory"  world.  Many  economists 
would  have  little faith  in the correctness  of these  restrictions,  making  esti- 
mation  of (5) an endeavor  of questionable  value  from  their  point of view. 
But at least  there  exists  a set of restrictions  on the economic  structure  that 
makes  (5) a sensible  equation  to estimate.  As far as I can determine,  no set 
of restrictions  on the parameters  of a standard  Keynesian  model,  like the 
one formed  by equations  (1) through  (4), can be used to rationalize  some 
of the equations  fitted  in the literature  on price  expectations  and the in- 
terest  rate.18 
Behavior  of the Model  under  Rational  Expectations 
The  implementation  of Fisher's  theory  described  in the preceding  section 
is subject  to two severe  limitations.  First, its appropriateness  depends  on 
the adequacy  of some  very  tight  restrictions  on the slopes  of the LM curve, 
17. On this see Bailey, National Income  and the  Price Level, pp. 49-54, and Sargent, 
"Anticipated  Inflation  and the Nominal Rate of Interest." 
18. For example,  Robert J. Gordon has regressed  a nominal  interest  rate on current 
and past inflation and current  and past velocity (that is, the nominal income-money 
ratio), interpreting  the coefficients  on current  and lagged inflation as estimates of the 
weights  that people use in forming  price expectations.  I know of no way of interpreting 
such an equation  either  as a structural  equation  or as a reduced  form equation,  at least 
within the class of Keynesian  macroeconomic  models of which  the simple  model here  is 
a member.  See Robert  J. Gordon,  "The  Recent  Acceleration  of Inflation  and Its Lessons 
for the Future,"  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (1:1970), pp. 8-47. (This docu- 
ment is referred  to hereafter  as BPEA, followed by the date.) Also see Gordon's "Dis- 
cussion"  in Econometrics  of Price Determination.  The point being  made  here  is developed 
in greater  detail in my "The Fundamental  Determinants  of the Interest  Rate: A Com- 
ment,"  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 55 (August 1973),  pp. 391-93. It should 
be noted that Gordon has estimated a much improved equation in his "Inflation in 
Recession and Recovery,"  BPEA (1:1971), pp. 145-47. That equation  can be regarded 
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the IS curve, and the short-run  PhilLips  curve. Second, equation  (4) has 
often been criticized  as an excessively  naive theory  of expectations,  since 
it fails to incorporate  the possibility  that people  form expectations  about 
the price  level by using  information  other  than current  and lagged  prices. 
One tractable  way of meeting  this second  criticism  is to hypothesize  that 
the  expectations  of the public  are  rational  in the sense  of Muth  and  Samuel- 
son,19  and are thus equivalent  with the optimal  predictions  of economic 
and statistical  theory.  For purposes  of the analysis  here, this hypothesis 
would  involve assuming  that the public  (a) knows  the true reduced  form 
for the price  level,  (b) knows  the probability  distributions  or rules  govern- 
ing the evolution  of the exogenous  variables,  and (c) combines  this infor- 
mation to form optimal  (least squares)  forecasts  of the price level. Two 
reasons  might be given for entertaining  the hypothesis  that expectations 
are  rational.  First,  it makes  concrete  and operational  the appealing  notion 
that people use information  besides  past prices  in forming  their forecasts 
of the price  level. Second,  in certain  instances  it has been possible  to test 
the hypothesis  empirically  by using the test proposed  by Samuelson,  and 
the hypothesis  has fared  pretty  well when tested on data on stock prices, 
commodities  prices,  and interest  rates.20 
When  (4) is replaced  with  the assumption  that expectations  are  rational, 
the system  formed  by equations  (1), (2), and  (3) implies  a version  of Fisher's 
theory  in which  the real rate of interest  is statistically  independent  of the 
systematic  part  of the money  supply,  so that  foreseen  changes  in the money 
supply affect the nominal rate of interest only to the extent that they 
alter the expected  rate of inflation.  This result holds regardless  of the 
magnitudes  of the slopes  of the IS, LM, and short-run  Phillips  curves.  (In 
fact, for the model to possess  an equilibrium,  b must be strictly  less than 
zero.)  In this section,  I propose  to show  that the invariance  of the real  rate 
of interest  with  respect  to the systematic  part  of the money  supply  requires 
19. Muth,  "Rational  Expectations  and the Theory  of Price  Movements,"  and Samuel- 
son, "Proof that Properly  Anticipated  Prices  Fluctuate  Randomly." 
20. See ibid. The evidence  is reviewed  by Eugene  F. Fama in "Efficient  Capital  Mar- 
kets: A Review  of Theory  and Empirical  Work,"  Journal  of Finance,  Vol. 25 (May 1970), 
No. 2, pp. 383-417. Evidence  that the hypothesis  of rational  expectations  can be com- 
bined with the expectations  theory  of the term  structure  to produce  a workable  explana- 
tion of the term structure  is presented  in Robert J. Shiller,  "Rational  Expectations  and 
the Structure  of Interest  Rates" (Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology, 
1972). Also see Franco Modigliani and Shiller, "Inflation,  Rational Expectations  and 
the Term Structure  of Interest  Rates," Economica,  N.S., Vol. 40 (February  1973),  pp. 
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only (a) the assumption  of an aggregate  supply  schedule  like (1), and (b) 
the assumption  that expectations  are rational. 
To close  the  model  formed  by equations  (1), (2), and  (3), I now posit  that 
expectations  about the logarithm  of the price level are rational. This 
amounts  to requiring  that 
(8)  *:P*  = Ept+,, 
where  Ept+1  is the conditional  mathematical  expectation  of Pt+1  formed 
using the model and information  about the exogenous  and endogenous 
variables  available  as of time t. Equation  (8) asserts  equality  between  the 
psychological  expectation  t+ip* and the objective  conditional  expectation 
Ept+i. 
To complete  the model under  (8), I must specify  the behavior  of the 
exogenous  variables  and random  terms  that condition  the expectation  in 
(8). I assume  that  the money  supply  is governed  by the linear  feedback  rule 
(9)  mtl+  -'  wi nt-i +  E  vi (Si  v  +_i E 
i=0  i==o  i_i=o 
~~~~+  E  v,  ?  t-i  +  E  Lk_+EV  t-i+  ml 
where  the wzs  and vjs are parameters  and {mt  is a normally  distributed, 
serially uncorrelated  random variable with mean zero; (mt+1  satisfies 
E(mt+1  I mt, mt-i  *... i  m  t-1  ,...  *  Zt, *..)  =  0 and  represents  the random 
part of the money supply  that cannot be predicted  on the basis of past 
variables.  This part  might  well result  from deliberate  policy-making  deci- 
sions, but simply  cannot  be predicted  on the basis of information  about 
the state of the economy.  The remaining,  systematic,  part of the money 
supply,  which in (9) is represented  by distributed  lags in all of the dis- 
turbances  and exogenous  variables  appearing  in the model, can be pre- 
dicted perfectly,  given the values of all current  and lagged exogenous 
variables  and disturbances.  Since each endogenous  variable  is a linear 
combination  of the exogenous  variables  and the disturbances,  any sort of 
linear  feedback  from  the exogenous  and  endogenous  variables  to the money 
supply  can  be represented  by (9). Thus,  one  justification  for assuming  (9) is 
that it is a very general  rule capable  of encompassing  feedback  from, for 
example,  prices,  output,  and  the interest  rate  to the money  supply.  Further- 
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tion, feedback  rules of the form (9) with  0mt+l-O  are known  to be op- 
timal.21 
The random  terms t, Ut, and  t, and the exogenous  variables  Zt  and k, 
are each governed  by an autoregressive  process 
Et+1  =  P*Et  +  (et+j 
Ut-  = PUUt  +  {Ut+1 
(10)  flt+1  =  P71  ?t  +  Snt+l 
kt+l  =  p*kt +  ?kt+j 
Zt+l  =  PZZt  +  {Zt+1l 
co 
where  P*  (  E  Pi-  _j and so on. Here the ts are mutually uncorrelated, 
serially  uncorrelated,  normally  distributed  random  variables  with means 
zero. 
The  public  is assumed  to know,  or at least  to have  estimated,  the param- 
eters of (9) and (10). Where  required,  it uses this knowledge  to calculate 
the  pertinent  expectations  or least  squares  forecasts.  Then,  given  the system 
formed  by equations  (1), (2), (3), (8), (9), and (10), the equilibrium  price 
level can be written  as a function  of current  and  past  m, k, Z, e, q, and U: 
(11)  pt = R(mt,  mnt-1,  ... .,  kt, kt-11 *  *  *, zt  zt-ll  ..*.* 
et,  Et-11  .  .  . I 77t, 7t_jj  .  .  .,  Ut, Ut-l,  * * ) 
which  is the reduced  form  for the price  level. This reduced  form equation 
builds  in the fact that  pt is influenced  by E pt+1.  But  pt+l will be influenced 
by E Pt+2, so that Ep,+1 will depend  on Ept+2, and so on, and this must 
t+1  ~~~~~t  t 
be taken  into account  under  rationality.  Appendix  A, where  R is calculated 
explicitly,  shows how forecasts  of next period's  price  are forced,  through 
this dependence,  to take  into account  forecasts  of the values of the exog- 
enous variables  influencing  the price  level in all subsequent  periods.22  In 
21. Except  for the fact that I have added  the stochastic  term fmt, this is an example  of 
the kind of linear  feedback  rule  studied  by Gregory  C. Chow, "Optimal  Stochastic  Con- 
trol of Linear  Economic  Systems,"  Journal  of Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  Vol. 2 (August 
1970),  pp. 291-302. 
22. Such  an equilibrium  is calculated  for a nonstochastic  model  by R. E. Hall in "The 
Dynamic Effects  of Fiscal Policy in an Economy with Foresight,"  Review  of Economic 
Studies,  Vol. 38 (April 1971),  pp. 229-44. For a linear, stochastic  model, an example  of 
such an equilibrium  is calculated  by Thomas J. Sargent  and Neil Wallace  in "Rational 
Expectations  and the Dynamics  of Hyperinflation,"  International  Economic  Review,  Vol. 
14 (June 1973),  pp. 328-50. Also see Lucas, "Econometric  Testing  of the Natural Rate 
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forming  these  expectations,  individuals  consider  the money  supply  rule  (9) 
and the autoregressions  for the disturbances  and exogenous  variables  (10). 
The parameters  of equations  (9) and  (10) are  thereby  built  into the reduced 
form  R of (1  1).  Consequently,  the  parameters  of the  reduced  form  R depend 
on both  the structural  parameters  of the model  and the parameters  of the 
monetary  rule  (9) and  the autoregressions  (10).  The parameters  of (11) will 
thus  not be invariant  with  respect  to systematic  changes  in the money  sup- 
ply rule  that have  either  been  publicly  announced  or in effect  long enough 
for the public  to detect  them.23 
The  reduced  form  equation  (11)  can  be combined  with  the money  supply 
rule  (9) and  the laws  governing  the random  terms  and  exogenous  variables 
(10) to yield the probability  distribution  of pt,+i conditional  on data ob- 
served  up through  time t: 
Prob  (p,+  <  F I  m, =  mo, m_1 =  imnl.,  k  *  =  ko, kt_-,kl,  * 
Zt  Z=  0Zt-1  =  Zl  .  * *  E  t  =EO0  Et-1  =j  ... ** 
(12)  Ut  UO,  Ut-,  =  U1  * * *  t =  0  7t-1  =  1  ... 
=  H(F, mo, ml, . . .,  ko0  k,  . ..  Z,Z Z,  ... 
60~ ED  ..  *  *,uo  UD,  ..  *  *  10,  1  q  **) 
The conditional  expectation  in (8) is evaluated  with  respect  to (12): 
(13)  t+lPt 
=E pt+l I  mt. mt-,  kt, kt.i 
*  Zo Zt-i  ...  Ev *...  U  *.. *  t) 
F d H (F  I  mt,  m,_l, . . .,$  kt,  kt-D .. *  *,  t_i  t-l  * *  ti * *  Ut,  * * * "O. 
For convenience,  let  at  denote  the set of variables  upon  which  the expecta- 
tion (13) is conditioned,  so that 
(13')  * = E(ptl I  Ot) 
where  Ot  includes  al observations  on m, k, Z, E, U, and  v dated  t and  earlier. 
It is now easy  to show  that the system  is described  by two intimately  re- 
lated propositions  that reflect  central  aspects  of the monetarist  point of 
view. First, a natural  rate of output  exists  in the sense  that the deviation 
of output  from its normal  level is statistically  independent  of the system- 
atic parts of monetary  and fiscal  policies;  that is, widely  known  changes 
23. The implications  for the theory  of economic  policy of this characteristic  of models 
with rational expectations are carefully drawn out by Lucas, "Econometric  Policy 
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in the ws and vs of equation  (9) and in the pzs of equation  (10) have no 
effects  on the expected  value  of (y -  k). Second,  the real  rate  of interest  is 
independent  of the systematic  part  of the money  supply;  that  is, alterations 
in the ws and vs of the feedback  rule (9) have no effects  on the expected 
value of the real rate. (Random  movements  in the money supply, rep- 
resented  by  ,mt, do have  effects  on both aggregate  supply  and the real  rate 
of interest.) 
The first  of these propositions,  which  is due to Lucas,24  follows  from a 
simple  and well-known  property  that, under  rationality,  characterizes  the 
prediction  error  that appears  in the aggregate  supply  schedule  (1). Using 
(13), the prediction  error  is 
Pt-  E(Pt I  Ot-1) 
The regression of the prediction error on At-l is 
El{[pt -  E(p, I  Ot1)]  I  Gt-1}  =  E  tI  t-1) -  E(pt I t)  =  0, 
which shows that the prediction  error  is independent  of all elements  of 
At-l.  Substituting  this result  into the conditional  expectation  of equation 
(1) gives 
(14)  E((yt -  kt) I  Ot-1)  =  E(Ut I  Ot-1) =  E(Ut I  Ut-l  Ut-2* 
Since Ut  depends  only on lagged Us, equation  (14) shows  that  y -  k is in- 
dependent  of all components  of At-l  except  lagged  values  of U. That part 
of the current  money  supply  (or the fiscal  policy  variables  in Zt) that can 
be expressed  as a linear  combination  of the elements  of At-l  (that is, the 
"systematic"  part  of policy)  therefore  has no effect  on the expected  value 
of Yt  -  kt, regardless  of the parameters  of that linear  combination. 
The second  proposition-that the real  rate of interest  is independent  of 
the systematic  part  of the money  supply  rule-stands and falls with Lucas' 
natural  rate proposition.25  Solving equation  (2) for the nominal  rate of 
interest  gives 
24. Lucas, "Econometric  Testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis"; "Expectations 
and the Neutrality  of Money"; and "Econometric  Policy Evaluation." 
25. The result requires  that both m and p be excluded  from the aggregate  demand 
schedule,  except  for the latter's  appearance  as part  of the term  Ept+j -  pi. As mentioned 
in note 15, this seems to be a standard  specification  in macroeconometric  models. It is, 
however,  well known that including  a real balance  effect  in the aggregate  demand  sched- 
ule modifies  Fisher's  theory in a static, full employment  context. See Robert Mundell, 
"Inflation  and  Real  Interest,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  Vol.  71 (June  1963),  pp. 444  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1973 
(15)  rt =c  (yt-k)-  Zt + E(pt&  l I  A)-pt  et 
Taking expectations in (15) conditional on at-l  and substituting from (14) 
gives 
(16)  E{[r-E(pt  I t)  +pt] I  At} 
dE(zt I  At_l)  +  c-1 E(Ut  I  At_l)-c-1  E(e,  I  Ot_). 
Equation  (16)  states  that  the real  rate  of interest  is correlated  with  elements 
of At-l  only to the extent  that they help predict  subsequent  values  of the 
random  variables  Ut  and et and subsequent  fiscal  policy-that is, the var- 
iables  in Zt. Of course,  Ut  depends  only on lagged  Us,  while t depends  only 
on lagged  es.  The real  rate of interest  is therefore  a function  of the system- 
atic parts of fiscal  policy, but is independent  of the parameters  that de- 
termine  the systematic  part  of the money  supply.  In this system  changes  in 
the money  supply  at t that can be foreseen  as of time t -  1 leave  the real 
interest  rate  at t unchanged.  It follows  that  the systematic  part  of the  money 
supply  affects  the nominal  rate of interest  only to the extent  that it influ- 
ences  the expected  rate  of inflation.  The only part  of the money  supply  at t 
that affects  the real  rate at t is the random  component  (mt* 
RESULTS  OF  CHANGING  ASPECTS  OF  THE  MODEL 
These  two propositions  will  characterize  models  much  more  complicated 
than the one used here  so long as expectations  are assumed  to be rational 
and aggregate  supply  is governed  by an equation  like (1).26  For example, 
280-83. The expected  rate of inflation  can be viewed  as the rate of tax on real balances. 
Where  mt -  Pt appears  in the aggregate  demand  schedule-either alone, as in the real 
balance  effect, or multiplied  by minus  the expected  rate of inflation,  as implied  by some 
definitions  of disposable  income-changes in the expected  rate of inflation  bring about 
changes  in the real  rate  of interest,  just as do changes  in the other  tax rates  included  in Zt. 
26. The behavior  of the model under  rational  expectations  would not be substantially 
altered  if the aggregate  supply hypothesis  were expanded  to be 
yt-ki  =y  It-  tEpt-  -  Ep+j  -  EPt+i)]  +  u, 
which  states  that aggregate  supply  responds  to the "surprise"  component  of this period's 
price level minus the amount by which an average  of expectations  of prices  in n future 
periods  is revised  as a result  of new information  received  this period.  The above equation 
embodies  the notion that aggregate  supply  responds  to the part of the prediction  error 
Pt-  E Pt that  is viewed  as transitory.  The argument  in the above  equation  still possesses 
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the two propositions  would continue  to hold if the assumption  of exog- 
enous productive  capacity  kt is abandoned  and instead  kt is assumed  to 
depend  on past  values  of output  and  the real  rate  of interest.  This  specifica- 
tion would  permit  growth  in capacity  to be influenced  by capital  accumula- 
tion, which  in turn  could be governed  by a version  of the distributed  lag 
accelerator. 
For another  modification  that would  leave the two propositions  intact, 
(1) might  be replaced  with  the alternative  aggregate  supply  schedule 
(1') 
Yt 
P  k  -  E  X:-)  +  U', 
which application  of the Koyck-Jorgenson  transformation  shows to be 
equivalent  to 
(1")  Ye-Yt  -  kX  - 
A  si  [Pt-i  I  -i-1)] +  E  (pi Ut-i 
where the (is  are functions of the Xis.  According  to (1'), deviations  of 
aggregate  supply  from normal  capacity  output display  some persistence, 
so that Yt  -  k, depends  partly  on a distributed  lag of prediction  errors,  as 
equation  (1") shows.  If (1") replaces  (1) in the version  of the model with 
rational  expectations,  both Yt  -  kt and the real rate of interest  remain 
independent  of the systematic  part of the money  supply.  To see this, one 
has only to note that the systematic  parts  of current  and lagged  values  of 
the money  supply  contribute  nothing  to the prediction  errors  that appear 
in (1"), nor do they influence  the Us. Of course,  the random  parts  of the 
money  supply, m  will still  influence  y -  k. Under  (1"),  the effects  of im  on 
y  -  k will be distributed  over  time, but the two propositions  about the 
systematic  parts  of policy  variables  remain  unaltered. 
In essence,  two features  of the  model  must  hold  to validate  these  proposi- 
tions. First,  expectations  must  be rational.  Second,  the model  must  possess 
"super-neutrality,"  by which  I mean  that proportionate  changes  in either 
the levels  or the rates  of change  of all endogenous  and  exogenous  variables 
all of the properties  of prediction  errors  that are used  in the text to show the behavior  of 
the model under  rationality. 
By invoking  the expectations  theory of the term structure  of interest  rates, yields on 
bonds with maturities  greater  than one period  could be included  in the model. It would 
be straightforward,  for example, to enter an n-period rate in the aggregate  demand 
schedule,  modifying  the price  expectation  term accordingly,  while keeping  a one-period 
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denominated  in dollars  (prices,  wages,  and stocks  of paper  assets  of fixed 
dollar  value such as money and bonds)  do not disturb  an initial equilib- 
rium.  It should  be noted that current  and expected  values  of endogenous 
and  exogenous  nominal  variables  are  among  those  changed  proportionately 
in the experiment  defining  super-neutrality. 
Appendix  B demonstrates  that key features  of the results  remain  intact 
even  when  individuals  have  much  less information  and  wisdom  than  I have 
imputed  to them  so far, so long as they have  access  to information  at least 
about lagged prices and use it rationally  in forecasting  the price level. 
Appendix  B also shows that dropping  the assumption  that bonds and 
equities  are perfect  substitutes  does not change  the essential  character  of 
the model. 
Testing  the Model 
A  "WRONG"  TEST 
The usual way of implementing  Fisher's  theory about interest  and ex- 
pected  inflation  has been to regress  nominal  interest  rates  on current  and 
lagged values of the logarithm  of the price level, interpreting  the coeffi- 
cients  as estimates  of the distributed  lag by which  the public  seems  to form 
its expectations  about  inflation.  The  implausibility  of those  distributed  lags 
as devices  for forming  predictions  of inflation  has weakened  the appeal  of 
Fisher's  doctrine.  However,  according  to the version of the model with 
rational  expectations  described  here,  these  regressions  are not a valid  test. 
In particular,  there  is no reason  to expect  that  the distributed  lags  estimated 
in such regressions  provide  the basis for plausible,  or in some sense opti- 
mal, forecasts  of inflation.  This is so even though  the model predicts  that 
the real  rate  of interest  is independent  of the money  supply  rule,  a proposi- 
tion that can be taken  as capturing  the essence  of Fisher's  theory. 
To establish  the inappropriate  nature  of the standard  regressions,  I use 
equation  (15) to calculate  the regression  of the nominal  interest  rate on 
current  and lagged  prices: 
(17)  E(r, IPt,  Pt-1, *  *  *) P=  t(Ptl-P)  Pt Pt-1 Pt-2, .  .  .1 
+  cl  E(Ut I  Pt, Pt-_1  ..  d)-  E(Zt Ipt,  Pt,-,  .  . 
+  C-1 yE{[pt-E(pt  I  At_l)]  IPP  Pt-,  pt_1 
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Regressions  of interest  on current  and lagged  prices  have  been  interpreted 
as yielding estimates of the regression E[(p,1  -  pt)  Pt, Pt-i,  .  . J.1  In the 
model  here,  however,  that interpretation  is erroneous  because  of the pres- 
ence of the second,  third,  fourth,  and fifth terms  in (17). The model pre- 
dicts that the exogenous variables Zt  will be correlated with current and 
perhaps  past values  of the price  level. The model also predicts  that et and 
Ut  will be correlated  with  the current  price  level: a positive  "pip"  in (t  in- 
creases  both r, and  pt, an effect  that has nothing  to do with  the formation 
of expectations  of inflation.27  The presence  of this effect  pollutes  the rela- 
tionship  between  r and  p from  the point of view of extracting  an estimate 
of E[(pt+1 -  pt)  I  pt, pt-1,  . . J. The presence of the third and fourth terms 
similarly  biases  the regression  of r on current  and past  ps taken  as a device 
for recovering  forecasts  of inflation. 
The biases pinpointed  by equation  (17) could easily be spectacularly 
large  and could  in principle  give rise  to the presence  of a Gibson paradox 
in data  generated  by the model.  Very  long and  implausible  distributed  lags 
of interest on inflation could be generated,  since the model embodies 
sources  of dependence  between  the interest  rate and price level that are 
not accounted  for by the presence  of expected  inflation.  This fact implies 
that demonstrations  of the "implausibility"  of regressions  of interest  on 
inflation  cannot  refute  the  version  of Fisher's  theory  embodied  in the  model. 
A  "PROPER"  TEST 
The straightforward  approach  to testing  the model would  be to subject 
the theory's  centerpiece,  the natural  rate hypothesis,  to an empirical  test. 
However,  as Lucas has forcefully  pointed out, almost all such work has 
been wholly inadequate.28  Basically,  these improper  tests29  have all in- 
volved  fitting  a structure  that can be rearranged  to yield  an expression  for 
uiaemployment  of the following  form: 
27. This is presumably  the kind of effect  that Tobin had in mind when he questioned 
Irving  Fisher's  explanation  of the Gibson paradox.  See his "Comment"  in Proceedings 
of a Symposium  on Inflation:  Its Causes, Consequences,  and Control  (Wilton, Conn.: 
Kazanjian  Economics  Foundation,  Inc., 1968), pp. 53-54. 
28. Lucas, "Econometric  Testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis." 
29. The test was described  by both Robert Solow and James  Tobin in their  contribu- 
tions to the Proceedings  of a Symposium  on Inflation.  One of the best-known  applications 
of the test is Gordon, "Recent  Acceleration  of Inflation." 448  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
(18)  Unt  =  I(pt  -  pi  Ptp)  + residuals, 
i=1 
where  the unemployment  rate Unt  can be regarded  as an inverse  index of 
Yt  -  kt.  In every  case,: has been  less than  0, indicating  a short-run  tradeoff 
between  inflation  and employment.  The standard  test of the natural  rate 
hypothesis  has been to determine  whether,  according  to the estimates  of 
equation  (18), a once-and-for-all  increase  in the rate of inflation  implies  a 
permanent  change  in the unemployment  rate.30  But even if it doesn't, a 
once-and-for-all  jump in some higher-order  difference  in the (log of the) 
price level will always  imply a permanent  change  in the unemployment 
rate in the context  of equation  (18) with any fixed  set of f s. Thus,  if the 
authorities  can make  the price  level follow a path 
Pt =  E2  i  P-  +  ) 
they can, by increasing  4 by do, have a permanent,  predictable  effect  on 
unemployment  of Ado. This  conclusion,  however,  is incompatible  with  the 
natural  rate hypothesis,  which requires  that certain,  foreseen,  once-and- 
for-all  jumps  in any order  difference  of the price  level have no permanent 
effect  on the unemployment  rate.  Put  another  way,  the natural  rate  hypoth- 
esis requires  that changing  from one deterministic  (and hence perfectly 
predictable)  process  for the price  level  to another  will leave  the unemploy- 
ment rate unaltered.  No values  of the Ais  of equation  (18) are capable  of 
representing  that hypothesis,  given  the way the estimated  Ais  are manipu- 
lated  in the test. The test, therefore,  cannot  possibly  be fair.31 
Lucas  has described  and implemented  two proper  tests of the rational 
expectations  version  of the natural  rate  hypothesis.32  One involves  testing 
a set of cross-equation  restrictions  implied  by the hypothesis,  the other, 
testing  across  countries  for a relationship  between  the slope of a country's 
short-run  inflation-unemployment  tradeoff  and  the variance  of its nominal 
aggregate  demand  implied  by the hypothesis.  Lucas  is unable  to reject  the 
natural  rate  hypothesis  on the basis of either  of these  tests. 
Although, to my knowledge,  Lucas' are the only proper  tests of the 
30. Usually, the weights  are constrained  to satisfy E  vi =  1, so that a once-and-for- 
il1 
all jump in the log of the price  level is not permitted  to imply a permanent  change  in the 
unemployment  rate. 
31. Again, see Lucas, "Econometric  Testing  of the Natural  Rate Hypothesis." 
32. Lucas, "Some International  Evidence  on Output-Inflation  'rradeoffs." Thomas  J. Sargent  449 
natural  rate hypothesis  implemented  to date, there are other tests of the 
natural  rate  hypothesis.  One exploits  the implications  under  rationality  of 
the hypothesis  that  aggregate  supply  is a function  of the error  in predicting 
the current  price level on the basis of data available  at some previous 
moment.  Using the unemployment  rate Un,  as an inverse  index  of Yt  -kt, 
the aggregate  supply  schedule  (1') can be written 
(19)  Un  =  I3(pt-Ept  I  At_l)  +  X2\ Un_i + ut,  A<  0. 
Here  ut is a random  disturbance  assumed  to be normally  distributed  and 
to obey E(u, I  Ot-1  Ut-1  Ut-2,  .  .  )  =  E(Ut  I Ut-1,  Ut-2  .  .  .).  To take a special 
example  that will illustrate  the idea behind  the test, suppose  that ut  is not 
serially  correlated  and that all of the Xis  equal  zero. Taking  expectations 
in (19) conditional on any subset 61t-1  of at-l  gives 
E(Un, I =lt-)=  0, 
an implication  that could be tested  empirically  by regressing  Unt  on com- 
ponents  of  lt-,. However,  the presence  of nonzero  \is or serial  correlation 
in ut  would  destroy  this implication,  since  then 
E(Unz  I  I  Un-,  .. *.  ,  Unl0q)-  =  Unt i +  E(ut  t It)  0. 
i==1 
The term  Xi  \  Unt_ obviously  would not be zero; if ut is serially  corre- 
lated,  then  E(ut  I  61t-1)  also  departs  from  zero  to the extent  that  components 
of Olt-, proxy  for lagged  us. 
To illustrate  how a feasible  test could  be carried  out under  these  circum- 
stances,  suppose  that u, follows  the first-order  Markov  process 
Ut  =  pUt-i  +  cutl  IPI  <  1, 
where  (ut  is a normally  distributed,  serially  uncorrelated  random  variable. 
Then  notice that (19) can be written  as 
q 
(20)  Un, =  (X1  +  p) Unt_I  +  E  (Xi  -  pX,_)  Unt  -  PXq  Ut-l-q 
+  (Pt  -  Ept I  at-)  -fp  (pt-  -Eptl  I  at-2)  +  (ut 
Taking  expectations  in (20) conditional  on Unt-1,  . . .,  Unti,-,  and any 
subset  1t-2  of  t-2  yields 450  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
(21)  E(Unt I Unt_II  ...  ,  Unf_lqI, Cit-2)  (X1 +  p)  Unt_I 
+  ?  (xi -  pXi_1)  Unt_i  - pAq  Untqi1  i-2 
-  PiE[(Pt-l  -  EPtI  at-2)  I Un8t1]. 
Equation  (21) holds because  the prediction  error  Pt  -  E Pt  I  At-l  is inde- 
pendent  of all components  of 0t-,1  which  include  the regressors  in (21), 
while  the lagged  prediction  error  is independent  of Unt-2 . . .,  Unt_q_1 and 
01t-2,  but not of Un,_1.  According  to (21), the regression  of the unemploy- 
ment rate against Unt1,  . . .,  Unt-_l,  and some components of Ot-2  ought, 
on the natural  rate  hypothesis,  to have  zero coefficients  on components  of 
0t-2.  This  implication  can  be tested  empirically  by calculating  the  regression 
indicated  in (21). If p =  0, then (20) implies  that 
E(Un, I  Unt1,  . . .,  Untq-1_,  at-l)  =  E(Unt  I  Unt1,  .  I Un,-,-,) 
so that  if the us in (19) are  serially  uncorrelated,  components  of at-  ought 
not to obtain coefficients  significantly  different  from zero when they are 
added  to a regression  of Unt  on enough  lagged  values  of itself.  On the other 
hand,  if u, is governed  by an nth order  autoregressive  process 
n 
Ut  pi  E  tt-i +  (utl 
where  (at  has the same properties  imputed  to it above, then it is readily 
shown  that the natural  rate  hypothesis  implies  only that 
E(Unt I Un,-I,  Un,-2,  ...  Uflt-n-q,  Olt-n-1) 
=  E(Unt I Unt-1, Unt-2, * *  Unt-n-q) 
The  higher  the order  of serial  correlation  in the us, the more  periods  com- 
ponents  of at  must be lagged  to warrant  the implication  that their  coeffi- 
cients  are  zero. 
One  can  view  the test from  a slightly  different  perspective  by considering 
the following  very  general  mixed  autoregressive,  moving-average  represen- 
tation  of the unemployment  rate, 
q  f 
(22)  Un, =  \X Unl_  +  >2 cai  ut_i' 
i=1  i=O 
where the Xs and ais are parameters and where (at  is again a serialy un- 
correlated,  normally  distributed  random  variable.  The natural  rate hy- 
pothesis  can be viewed  as permitting  tut  to be correlated  with values of Thomas  J. Sargent  451 
endogenous  variables  dated t and later, but as requiring  (ut  to be uncor- 
related  with  past endogenous  and exogenous  variables,  so that 
E(Qut  I  Ot,)  = 0. 
This  means  that the "innovation,"  or new random  part of the unemploy- 
ment  rate,  cannot  be predicted  from  past values  of any variables,  and that 
it cannot  be affected  by movements  in past values of government  policy 
variables.  This specification  captures  the heart of the natural  unemploy- 
ment rate hypothesis,  and implies  that there is no better  way to predict 
subsequent  rates  of unemployment  than fitting  and extrapolating  a mixed 
autoregressive,  moving-average  process  in the unemployment  rate itself. 
This  suggests  that  the natural  unemployment  rate  hypothesis  can be tested 
against  specific  competing  hypotheses  by setting  up statistical  prediction 
"horse  races."  My proposed  regression  test is an alternative  test, and ex- 
ploits the notion that, if EutU  I  at-1)  =  0, then (22) implies that 
q 
E(Unt  I Unt_-1. .*  ,  Unt_,s Ot-f-1)  =  E2 tX un,_. 
i=1 
To provide  material  for the test, regressions  (1), shown  below,  are  auto- 
gressions  for the unemployment  rate. 
(1)  Un, = 0.418 +  1.715 Un_i  -  1.046 Unt-2  +O0.245  Un,-3 
(0.164)  (0.116)  (0.199)  (0.115) 
R2 = 0.9245, standard  error  of estimate = 0.318, Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.984. 
Period of fit: 1952:1-1970:4. 
Un, =  0. 538 +  1. 553 Un_1 -  0.665  Unt2, 
(0.158)  (0.089)  (0.089) 
W2  = 0.9208, standard  error  of estimate = 0.325, Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.616. 
Period of fit: 1952:1-1970:4. 
where Un is the unemployment  rate for all civilian workers,  seasonally 
adjusted,  and t indicates  time  (data  for regressions  (1), and for regressions 
(2) and (3) below, unless  stated otherwise,  were obtained  from the data 
bank  for the Wharton  Econometric  Model). The numbers  in parentheses 
here and in the following  regressions  are standard  errors. 
Regressions  (2) and (3) include  various  components  of 0,1,  as well as 
lagged  values  of the unemployment  rate. In regression  (2), these compo- 
nents  are  the logarithm  of the  GNP deflator  (p),  seasonally  adjusted,  lagged 
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facturing  corrected  for overtime  payments,  not seasonally  adjusted  (w), 
lagged  one through  four quarters  (from  various  issues  of Employment  and 
Earnings). 
(2)  Unt =-0.723  +  1.600  Unt,  -  0.722  Unt-2 
(1.806)  (0.097)  (0.101) 
-20.982  P,-1 +  15.  805  P-2  +  0. 153  pt_3  +  2.574 Pt-4 
(13.607)  (20.223)  (20.087)  (14.002) 
+ 5.509 wt-1  +  3.152 wt-2-3.807wt-3-3.080wt-4. 
(8.960)  (10.125)  (10.014)  (8.327) 
R2  = 0.917,  standard  error  of estimate  = 0.333,  Durbin-Watson  statistic  = 1.684. 
F(8,65)  =  0.594. 
The F-statistic  pertinent  for testing  the null hypothesis  that the coeffi- 
cients  on laggedp  and  lagged  w are  zero  is 0.594,  which  implies  that  the null 
hypothesis  cannot  be rejected  at the 95 percent  confidence  level. Accord- 
ingly,  the natural  unemployment  rate  hypothesis  cannot  be rejected  on the 
basis of this regression.  The adjusted  standard  error  of the residuals  in 
regression  (2) (0.333)  is actually  larger  than  that obtained  by excluding  the 
ps and ws (0.325),  reported  in regressions  (1). 
Regression  (3) implements  the test by employing  a much larger  set of 
elements  of Ot-1 In addition  to three  lagged  values  of the unemployment 
rate, the regression  includes  values  of the logarithm  of the money supply 
(currency  plus demand  deposits),  seasonally  adjusted  (m), the federal  and 
state and local government  deficit  on the national  income  accounts  basis 
(Def);  and the logs of the GNP deflator,  seasonally  adjusted  (p), of the 
implicit  deflator  for personal  consumption  expenditures  (pc),  of the average 
hourly  wage rate in manufacturing,  seasonally  adjusted  (wr), of govern- 
ment  purchases  of goods  and services  (g), of total  federal  and  state  and  local 
government  employment,  seasonally  adjusted  (ng), and of GNP (y). Each 
of these  arguments  is included  lagged  one, two, and three  periods. 
(3)  Unt =  39.622  +  1.223 Unt_1  -  0.546 Unt-2  -  0.129  Unt_3 
(12.427)  (0.136)  (0.211)  (0.169) 
-  3.852  mt-  -  11.835  mt2  +  16.801 mt3  +  0.023  Deft- 
(9.839)  (15.926)  (9.620)  (0.016) 
-  0.006  Deft-2  +  0.020  Deft-3 +  26.268 pt- 1-25.552  Pt-2 
(0.020)  (0.018)  (21.702)  (24.210) 
+  27.416 pt3  -  7.807  pct-,  +  28.701  PCt-2  -57.719  pCt-3 
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-1.631  wrt_1  +  1.461 wrt-2 +  8.567  wrt-3+  3.448 gt- 
(8.068)  (10.286)  (7.623)  (2.917) 
-1.508gt-2+  3.812g t3+  4.909  ngtl  -13.424  ngt-2 
(3.723)  (2.662)  (10.333)  (14.168) 
+  4.725 ngt-3  +  1.151 Yt- -  8.560 Yt-2 -3.824  Yt-3 
(10.053)  (6.228)  (7.913)  (6.879) 
K2  =  0.9497, standard  error  of estimate =  0.259, Durbin-Watson  statistic =  2.161. 
F (24,48)  =  2.503. 
For regression  (3) the pertinent  F-statistic  for testing  the null  hypothesis 
that elements  of Ot-1  (other  than  lagged  rates  of unemployment)  have  zero 
coefficients  is 2.503.  This statistic  is distributed  with 24,48 degrees  of free- 
dom and so is significant  at the 99 percent  confidence  level.  As a result,  the 
null hypothesis  must be rejected.  The adjusted  standard  error  of estimate 
falls  from  the  0.318  reported  in (1)  to 0.259  when  the  components  of  at-l  are 
added'to the regression,  indicating  a modest but statistically  significant 
gain in explanatory  power. Consequently,  this application  of the test 
requires  rejection  of the version  of the natural  rate  hypothesis  that  assumes 
rational  expectations  formed  on the basis of at least the information  con- 
tained in the particular  set Olt-, used in the regression  under  discussion. 
Several  reasons  suggest  caution  in interpreting  the verdict  of this test. 
First,  as shown  above,  the test assumes  that  the us in equation  (19) are  not 
serially  correlated.  If, in fact, they are,  the test becomes  biased  in favor  of 
rejecting  the natural  rate  hypothesis.  Second,  the essence  of the natural  rate 
hypothesis  could stand unrefuted  even though tests using large subsets 
01t-1  find systematic  effects  of 01t-1  on Unt. This can occur if individuals 
form their  expectations  rationally  on less information  than is represented 
by O,t-.  In this regard,  it is noteworthy  that the natural  rate hypothesis 
cannot  be rejected  on the basis  of regression  (2), which  includes  only  lagged 
ws and  ps as components  of O,t-. Third,  the test could  lead to rejection  of 
the natural  rate hypothesis  if the us are correlated  with components  of 
lt-,.  This might occur, because, for example, current and lagged Os  have 
a direct  effect  on unemployment  that requires  no movement  in the price 
level, contrary  to the hypothesis  in (19). In this event,  systematic  changes 
in the price  level  could  still  leave  the unemployment  rate  unaffected,  so that 
policy  makers  confront  no "cruel  choice"  between  the average  rate of in- 
flation  and the average  unemployment  rate. 
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have  not been  shown  to be of comfort  to advocates  of any  particular  alter- 
natives  to the natural  rate  hypothesis.  That  is, it has not been shown  that 
an autoregression  for unemployment  yields  ex ante predictions  of unem- 
ployment  inferior  to those of a particular  structural  macroeconometric 
model that embodies  a particular  aggregate  supply  theory  other  than the 
natural  rate  hypothesis.  A particular  alternative  aggregate  supply  hypoth- 
esis might well be able to predict  unemployment  better  than an autore- 
gressive  moving-average  process,  but there  is no way of knowing  for sure 
until a horse  race  is held.33 
ANOTHER  TEST 
An alternative  test of the natural  unemployment  rate  hypothesis  can be 
carried  out by directly  estimating  the parameters  of a version  of equation 
(19), where  ut is now assumed  to be a serially  uncorrelated  random  term 
satisfying E(u, I  at-l)  =  0. Equation (19) embodies the null hypothesis to 
be tested,  the natural  unemployment  rate  hypothesis.34  I propose  to test it 
against  the following  alternative  hypothesis: 
(23) 
Unt =  X  Xi Unt_i  +  3(Pt  -  Ept I Ot_l)  +  (1 -  ca)(Ept I 0t-lPt_i)  +  u,. 
Equation  (23) states  that if ae  <  1 (e >  1),  then  increases  in the systematic 
part of the rate of inflation  decrease  (increase)  the unemployment  rate, 
contrary  to the natural  rate hypothesis.  On the natural  rate hypothesis, 
a =  1, which makes (23) equivalent  to equation  (19). My strategy  is to 
33. Charles  Nelson found that the predictions  of the unemployment  rate from a ver- 
sion of the Fed-M.I.T. model were inferior  to the predictions  from an autoregression. 
This was so even though for my purposes  Nelson's procedure  is biased in favor of the 
Fed-M.I.T.  model because  he permits  it to use the actual  values of the exogenous  varia- 
bles at the same date for which unemployment  is being forecast.  See Charles  R. Nelson, 
"The Prediction  Performance  of the FRB-MIT-PENN Model of the U.S. Economy," 
American Economic Review, Vol.  62 (December  1972), p. 914. 
34. It is common to write the natural  rate hypothesis  in a way that, under rational 
expectations,  would take the form 
q 
(a)  Unt  =  ?,  )Unt-,  +  i[(pt  -  pt-1)  -  E(pt  -  Pt-1)  I  ot-1] +  'it, 
t=l 
so that the surprise  increase  in the rate of inflation  is what boosts aggregate  supply.  But 
so long as pt-i is one of the variables  in ot-1,  it is straightforward  to show that 
(pt  -  pt-1)  -  E[(pt  -  pt-1)  I  ot-1]  =  pt  -  Ept I  Ot-l. 
It follows, then, that (a) is equivalent  with (19) in the text. Thomas  J. Sargent  455 
estimate  (23) and  to test the null hypothesis,  a = 1, against  the alternative 
hypothesis,  a 5  1.35 
In conducting  this test, two econometric  problems  must be overcome. 
First,  macroeconomic  theory  implies  that Un,  (or equivalently  Yt  -  k) and 
Pt are simultaneously  determined,  implying  that u, and Pt may be corre- 
lated.  For example,  take  a standard  macroeconomic  model  in which  aggre- 
gate demand,  (y -  k)d, depends  inversely  on the current  price  level, while 
aggregate  supply,  (y -  k)8,  responds  directly  to the  current  price  level.  With 
predetermined  expectations,  equation  (1) or (19) is an example  of such an 
aggregate  supply schedule,  while an aggregate  demand  schedule  in the 
p, y  -  k plane is derived  by using the portfolio  balance  schedule  (3) to 
eliminate  the nominal  interest  rate  from  the IS curve  (2). It is evident  that 
an increase  in ut causes  the aggregate  supply  schedule  to shift upward  in 
the p, y  -  k plane, causing the price level to rise, y  -  k to fall, and un- 
employment  to rise.  This  leads  to a positive  correlation  between  ut and  pt' 
provided,  for example,  that u is uncorrelated  with the disturbances  in the 
aggregate  demand  schedule  in thep, y -  k plane.  The  correlation  between  u 
and p makes  least squares  estimation  of (19) or (23) inappropriate.  This 
problem  can be overcome  in the standard  way, by using  the technique  of 
instrumental  variables:  replacing  pt in (23) by Pt, the predicted  value of p, 
from a first-stage regression including a constant,  Unt-1 through  Unt_q, 
and predetermined  variables  including  lagged prices, lagged values of 
other  variables  thought  to be endogenous  to the system,  and current  and 
lagged  values  of exogenous  variables. 
The second  econometric  challenge  is to produce  an appropriate  proxy 
for Ep, I  at-1.  Here I am assuming  that the regression  Ept I  Ot-l is linear  in 
At-1,  so that  Ept I  Ot-l  is in effect  formed  as if it were  the prediction  from  a 
least squares  regression  of Pt on At-1,  and therefore 
Ept It-1=  0t-1 
Pt =  50t-1  +  et  pt +  et, 
35. The test here is related to Lucas' ("Econometric  Testing of the Natural Rate 
Hypothesis"),  which tests the restrictions  across the reduced  forms for the price level 
and for output that are implied by rational  expectations  in conjunction  with an aggre- 
gate supply  schedule  like (1). For the test used here  it is necessary  neither  to specify  nor 
to estimate  the full reduced  forms for aggregate  supply  and the price  level. The test re- 
quires  that a list of some predetermined  variables  influencing  the price  level be available; 
but there  is no necessity  to have a complete  list of the predetermined  variables  appearing 
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where  8 is a vector of least squares  parameter  estimates  conformable  to 
At-l,  while  et  is a least squares  residual  vector  that is orthogonal  to 0t-1 by 
construction.  I propose  to use Pt in place of Ept  I  At-l  in equation  (23).36 
I then substitute  pt for Ept  I  Ot-l in (23) to obtain 
q 
(24)  Unt =  2 Xi UMt-i  +  f(pt -  P) +  (1 -  a) i(Pt -  Pt_1)  +  ut. 
Since it is assumed  that E(ut  I  Ot-1)  = 0, it follows that ut is uncorrelated 
with Pt. Furthermore,  by construction  (pt  -  Pt) is orthogonal  both to 
Unt-1  through Unt-,,  to Pti1, and to pt,  by the orthogonality of least squares 
residuals  to regressors.  However,  as I have argued  above, simultaneity 
leads  to a prediction  that ut  and  pj, and  hence  ut  and  Pt  -  p,  are  positively 
correlated.  Under  these  circumstances,  in which  Pt  -  P  is correlated  with 
the disturbance  while  the remaining  regressors  are orthogonal  both to the 
disturbance  and to Pt -P,  it follows that least squares  yields consistent 
estimates of the coefficients  on all regressors  except pt - Pt.37 Conse- 
quently,  in (24), application  of least squares  yields  consistent  estimates  of 
(1 -  a)3 and the Xis,  but inconsistent  estimates  of A. On the hypothesis 
that f  - 0, a consistent  estimate  of (1 -  a)3 is really  all that  is required  to 
test the natural  rate  hypothesis,  a = 1. 
As mentioned  above,  the inconsistency  in the estimates  of : can  be elimi- 
nated  by replacing  Pt by Pt in (24) to obtain 
(24')  Unt =  ':Xi  Un,j  +  f(it  -  Pt)'+ (1 -  a) O(Pt  -  Pti1) +  ut +  Oft, 
i-i 
36. Suppose that instead of using Ot-, to obtain  fit, P5 is obtained  from a regression 
of pt on some  subset Olt-,  of Ot-l,  so that 
pt  =  8oOlt-1  +  eot =  p? +  eot, 
where 8o is a vector of least squares  coefficients  conformable  to Olt-w and eot is a least 
squares  residual.  But individuals'  expectations  really  equal the  pt  of the text. Then 
t=  fi  +  eot  -  et, 
so that (24) can be written 
(b)  Unt  =  Z XiUnt-,  +  f(pt  -  Pi?) +  (1 -  a)1(3G3  -  pt-i)  +  Ut -  ca(eot  -  et). 
il1 
So  long  as  Olt-,  includes  the  constant,  Untt1  through  Untq,  and  pi-,,  eot  -  et  is 
orthogonal  to all arguments  of (b) except  pt - pI?.  It can readily  be shown that using  fio 
rather  than  ft leads to statistical  inconsistency  only in the estimate  of 13,  and in particular 
that its use does not produce  an inconsistent  estimate of (1 -  a)1,  the parameter  that 
must be estimated  to test the natural  rate hypothesis. 
37. Theil's specification  theorem  is being invoked here. See Henri Theil, Principles 
of Econometrics  (Wiley, 1971), pp. 548-49. Thomas  J. Sargent  457 
whereft  is a least squares  residual  in the first-stage  regression  used  to form 
P;  t is orthogonal  to Pt Pt,  Pt-i, and the lagged Uns,  so long as Pt-1,  the 
lagged  Uns,  and all the "first-stage"  variables  used  to obtain  P, are  used  in 
the first  stage to obtain  Pt. Since u, and Pt are expected  to be positively 
correlated,  and  since  the us,  thefs, and  (p - p)s  are  orthogonal  to the other 
regressors  in (24'), estimating  (24) rather  than (24') should produce  an 
estimate  of : that is biased  upward  in large  samples. 
In summary,  my strategy  is to decompose  the rate of inflation  into two 
parts:  a systematic  part that is predictable  from variables  known in the 
past, and a random  part that cannot be predicted  from past data. The 
natural  unemployment  rate  hypothesis  permits  the random  part  of the log 
of the price  level  (which  equals  the random  part  of the rate  of inflation)  to 
have an effect on the unemployment  rate, but denies  that the systematic 
part  of the rate  of inflation  can affect  unemployment.  That  hypothesis  can 
be tested by regressing  the unemployment  rate against  lagged values of 
itself and the random  and systematic  parts  of the rate of inflation. 
Table 1 reports  the results  of applying  the test to quarterly  data for the 
United States  over the period 1952:1-1970:4.  Two measures  of the price 
level were  used: the logarithm  of the GNP deflator  (p), and the log of a 
straight-time  wage index in manufacturing  (W).38  Regressions  (4.1) and 
(4.2) are  estimates  of equations  (24) and (24')  for  p, while  regressions  (5.1) 
and (5.2) are estimates  of the same  two equations  using w as the index of 
the price  level. 
The data that form  the raw  material  for these  regressions  are plotted  in 
Figures  1 and 2. In each  figure,  panel  (a) depicts  the estimated  innovation 
in the unemployment  rate-that is, the residual  in a regression  of the  unem- 
ployment  rate against  a constant  and three lagged values of itself. The 
natural  unemployment  rate hypothesis  permits  this innovation  to be in- 
versely  related  to the random  or unexpected  part  of the current  price  level, 
but denies  that it is related  to the systematic  or expected  part of the price 
level or rate of inflation. Panels (b) depict p -  P-i  and w -  w-1,  respec- 
tively, and panels (c) report the unexpected  parts, p -,p  and w'  -  . 
Panels  (d) report  the paths  of p and O. What  is claimed  for these  numbers 
38. To form  p or w, p or w was regressed  against a constant,  time, and three  lagged 
values each of p and w, as well as three  lagged values each of pc, g, Def, m, y, ng, Un, 
and wr,  where  each of these variables  is defined as in regression  (3). To obtain p  or 
Rv,  p or w was regressed  against  all of the variables  just listed and also the current  values 
of g, ng, m, and Def. P 
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Table 1. Regression  Results for Alternative  Tests of the Natural 
Unemployment  Rate Hypothesisa 
Regression 
Variable  and 
regression  statistic  4.1  4.2  5.1  5.2 
Variable 
Constant  0.2380  0.2380  0.694  0.694 
(2.172)  (0.216) 
Unemployment  rate lagged  1.717  1.717  1.667  1.667 
one quarter,  Un-,  (0.116)  (0.116) 
Unemployment  rate lagged  -1.029  -1.029  -0.999  -0.999 
two quarters,  Un-2  (0.199)  (0.196) 
Unemployment  rate lagged  0.246  0.246  0.216  0.216 
three quarters,  Un-3  (0.115)  (0.114) 
Random  (unexpected)  part of 
inflation,  based on the GNP 
deflator,  p, or the wage 
index, w 
p -p  -8.694  ...  ...  ... 
(19.656) 
p-p  ...  -75.156  ...  ... 
(68.672) 
w -  w7V  ...  ...  -11.884  ... 
(10.053) 
D-w  ...  ...  ...  ....  -50.500 
(52.109) 
Systematic  (expected)  part 
of inflation 
P -  P-1  14.085  14.085  ...  ... 
(11.130)  (11.903) 
w-  ...  ...  -13.215  -13.215 
(6.925)  (7.634) 
Regression  statistic 
]Z2  0.924  ...  0.928  ... 
Durbin-Watson  statistic  1.980  ...  1.952  ... 
a  2.62  1.19  0.11  0.74 
t-statistic  1.27  1.19  -1.91  -1.73 
Source: Derived from equations (24) and (24') ,using relevant  official U.S. series from the data bank of the 
Wharton Econometric Model. 
a.  The period of fit is 1952:1-1970:4. The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Standard  errors 
are in parentheses.  The standard  errors of coefficients  for regressions  (4.2) and (5.2) are asymptotic. For de- 
tailed definitions of symbols see discussion in text. 
is that, on my assumptions,  they represent  appropriate  decompositions  of 
w, p, w -  w 1, and p-P-i  for the purpose of estimating equation (24'). 
Regressions  (4.1), (4.2), (5.1), and (5.2) test the natural  rate hypothesis 
against  the alternative  hypothesis  that the systematic  part of the rate of Thomas J. Sargent  461 
inflation  affects  the unemployment  rate. The coefficient  on b, -  Pt-i  or 
t-  w,_1 estimates 3(1  -  a) and should equal zero on the natural rate 
hypothesis.  The t-statistic  reports  the ratio of the coefficient  onpt -Pt-i 
(t-  wt_1)  to its standard  error,  and  provides  the basis  for a statistical  test 
of the null  hypothesis.  Regressions  (5.1) and  (5.2)  come  closest  to support- 
ing a rejection  of the natural  rate  hypothesis.  The t-statistic  for regression 
(5.1) is -  1.91 and is distributed  according  to the t-distribution  with 70 
degrees  of freedom;  its absolute  value is thus slightly  below the critical 
value  of 1.99  for a two-tailed  test at the 95 percent  confidence  level. How- 
ever,  for a one-tailed  test,  which  is pertinent  for  testing  the  hypothesis  a =  1 
against  the alternative  a <  1, the critical  value of the t-statistic  is 1.66 at 
the 95 percent  confidence  level, so that the natural  rate hypothesis  can be 
rejected  at that confidence  level on a one-tailed  test. The t-statistic  for re- 
gression  (5.2),  being  based  on instrumental  variable  estimates,  has only an 
asymptotic  justification.  Its absolute  value  is below  the critical  level for a 
normal  variate  of 1.96 for a two-tailed  test at the 95 percent  confidence 
level,  but exceeds  the critical  value  of 1.65  for a one-tailed  test at this level. 
The  regressions  using  w  thus  provide  some  evidence  for  rejecting  the natural 
rate hypothesis,  although  not at an unusually  high confidence  level. On 
the other  hand,  the t-statistics  for regressions  (4.1) and  (4.2)  fail to support 
rejection  of the hypothesis.  The point estimates  in regressions  (5.1) and 
(5.2) indicate  an inverse  tradeoff  (ao  <  1) between  unemployment  and the 
expected  change  in w, a tradeoff  consistent  with a negatively  sloped  long- 
run Phillips  curve.  But the point estimates  in regressions  (4.1) and (4.2) 
indicate  a direct  tradeoff  (ae  >  1) between  unemployment  and  the system- 
atic part of inflation  in the GNP deflator,  and are thus not compatible 
with  a negatively  sloped  long-run  Phillips  curve.  Yet the short-run  Phillips 
curve  in regression  (4.2) has the usual  slope. 
The coefficients  onp -  p and wv  -  w in regressions  (4.2) and  (5.2)  exceed 
in absolute  value the coefficients  on p -  p  and w -  ui  in regressions  (4.1) 
and (5.1), respectively.  This is consistent  with the argument  that in large 
samples  the least squares  estimate  of the coefficient  on p -  p is biased 
upward  due to simultaneous-equations  bias. 
The coefficients on all regressors  except p -  p or  -p  (w -  uv  or w  -w) 
are identical  in the pairs  of regressions  (4.1) and (4.2) and (5.1) and (5.2). 
This  is no accident  but stems  from  the fact  that  by construction,  p - f  and 
p -  p (w -  v and w  - w)  are  each  orthogonal  to the remaining  regressors, 
which are the same in these pairs of regressions.  Consequently,  the co- 462  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
efcients on those remaining  regressors  are the same whichever  of these 
two "random"  terms  is included  in the regression. 
The  magnitudes  of the coefficients  in regressions  (4.2) and (5.2) support 
Lucas'  notion that the surprise,  or random,  part of the rate of inflation 
has a much larger  effect on the unemployment  rate than does the sys- 
tematic  part.  However,  in each  regression,  the t-statistic  for the coefficient 
on the surprise  part of inflation  indicates  statistical  insignificance.  If any- 
thing,  there  seems  to be less evidence  for a stable  relationship  between  un- 
employment  and the surprise  in inflation  than between  unemployment 
and  expected  inflation.  The  results  suggest  that  it is difficult  to isolate  even 
a stable  short-run  tradeoff  between  inflation  and unemployment  in these 
data. Some evidence  remains  for an inverse  tradeoff  between  the unem- 
ployment  rate  and  the systematic  part  of the rate  of inflation  in the straight- 
time wage  index, w, but it is not strong  enough  to reject  the natural  rate 
hypothesis  at a very high confidence  level. I imagine  that that evidence 
would not be sufficiently  compelling  to persuade  someone  to abandon  a 
strongly  held prior  belief  in the natural  rate  hypothesis. 
Conclusion 
This paper  has set out a macroeconomic  model for which  a version  of 
Irving  Fisher's  theory about the relationship  between  interest  rates and 
expected  inflation  is correct.  The model  turns  out to be characterized  by a 
number  of properties  that monetarists  have  attributed  to the economy.  Its 
structural  equations  themselves  do not differ  from those of the standard 
IS-LM-Phillips  curve  models used to rationalize  Keynesian  prescriptions 
for activist,  countercyclical  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  In fact, the statics 
of the model  with  fixed  or exogenous  expectations  about  the price  level  are 
of the usual  Keynesian  variety.39  Where  the model does differ  from stan- 
dard  implementations  of the IS-LM-Phillips  curve  model  is in the replace- 
ment  of the usual  assumption  of fixed-weight,  extrapolative  or "adaptive" 
expectations  by the assumption  that expectations  about future  prices  are 
rational  and  do not differ  systematically  from  the predictions  of the model. 
The result  of this change  in assumptions  is to produce  a model with the 
following  implications: 
39. There  are models  that, with exogenous  expectations,  display  static properties  that 
are very much more "monetarist"  than those possessed  by the model in this paper. An 
example  is James  Tobin's "A Dynamic Aggregative  Model," Journal  of Political Econ- 
omy, Vol. 63 (February  1955),  pp. 103-15. Thomas  J. Sargent  463 
1. The rate of output is independent of the systematic parts of both the 
money supply and fiscal policy variables. 
2.  The real rate of interest is independent of the systematic part of the 
money supply. 
3.  The monetary authority should  not  adopt  a  systematic policy  of 
pegging the nominal interest rate at some fixed level over many periods. 
Such a policy  would be very inflationary or deflationary, since strictly 
speaking, no equilibrium price level exists under it. 
4.  The distributed lag coefficients of money income behind money are 
variables, being dependent on, among other things, the money supply rule. 
Changes in the rule have the effect of altering the lag of money income 
behind money. More generally, the distributed lags in all of the reduced 
form equations change with changes in  the  rule governing any policy 
variable. 
These four implications of the model are among the most prominent 
doctrines associated with the Chicago school. Furthermore, the model's 
assumption that expectations are rational and its stress on the distinction 
between the effects of random and systematic movements in the price level 
have long been important elements of macroeconomics at Chicago. For 
example, Milton Friedman has written: 
...  it is argued  that once it becomes  widely  recognized  that prices  are rising, 
the advantages  [in terms of higher real output] . ..  will disappear:  escalator 
clauses or their economic  equivalent  will eliminate  the stickiness  of prices and 
wages and the greater  stickiness  of wages  than of prices; strong  unions will in- 
crease  still further  their  wage demands  to allow for price  increases;  and interest 
rates  will rise  to allow  for the price  rise.  If the advantages  are  to be obtained,  the 
rate of price  rise will have to be accelerated  and there  is no stopping  place short 
of runaway  inflation.  From this point of view, there may clearly  be a major 
difference  between  the effects  of a superficially  similar  price  rise, according  as it 
is an undesigned  and largely  unforeseen  effect  of such impersonal  events as the 
discovery  of gold, or a designed  result  of deliberative  policy action by a public 
body.40 
While the model described in this paper is consistent with a number of 
policy prescriptions associated with monetarism, or the Chicago school, 
40. Milton Friedman,  "The  Supply  of Money  and Changes  in Prices  and Output,"  in 
The Optimum  Quantity  of Money and Other  Essays (Aldine, 1969), p. 183; originally 
published  in The  Relationship  of Prices to Economic  Stability  and Growth,  Compendium 
of Papers Submitted  by Panelists Appearing  before the Joint Economic Committee, 
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it does not embody  the naive monetarism  of textbooks,  which requires 
either  a vertical  LM curve  or a horizontal  IS curve  or a vertical  short-run 
Phillips curve. On the contrary,  the model requires  only weak "sign" 
restrictions  on the parameters  of those three  curves. 
Given the empirical  evidence  of which I am aware,  there is room for 
disagreement  about the usefulness  of the kind of model described  in this 
paper.  On  the one hand,  one  test  of the natural  unemployment  rate  hypoth- 
esis above-which is the model's  centerpiece-points  to rejection  of that 
hypothesis  and seems  to imply  some scope for policy makers  to influence 
the mean  of the unemployment  rate  via a suitable  policy rule.  On the other 
hand, I am aware  of no evidence  that shows that any particular  existing 
structural  model embodying  a  specific alternative  to  the natural rate 
hypothesis  can outperform  it in predicting  the course of the unemploy- 
ment rate. Such evidence  ought to be in hand before  it is reasonable  to 
believe  that economists  know  enough  to design  policies  that can affect  the 
expected  value of the unemployment  rate. 
APPENDIX  A 
Equilibrium  of the Model 
with Rational  Expectations 
To  DETERMINE the equilibrium  of the system formed  by equations  (1), 
(2), (3), and (8), I first  solve (3) for rt: 
r,  =  b'  m, -b-'  pt -b-  Yt  -b-v 
Substituting  the above  equation  and (8) into (2) yields 
Yt =  kt +  cb-1 mt -  cb11  p  -cb-1  Yt  -cb-l1  - 
-c  E ptr1 + cpt +,et +  dZt. 
Solving  this equation  for  yt -  k,, and equating  the result  to the expression 
for Yt  -  kt derived  by substituting  (8) into (1), gives 
-  ~  E~, +  ~,  cbF1  c(1 -  bF1)  Pt -+  CEpt  +  Ut =  C  ir  t +  (1+C  1)Pt 
(I +  cb-c)  t  1+  cb1  +t  (1 +  Cb-'  t 
1+cb-1  kt + i  _ z Thomas  J. Sargent  465 
Solving  this equation  for  pt gives 
(A.1)  pt =Bo  Ept +  Bi m +  B2Ept+l 
t-1  t 
+  B3 -t+  B4 Et+  B5 Ut+  B6 k+  B7Zt, 
where 
B=  (rr) 
B,  cb1  +  -L/+  >  0 
-  1 cbf11  >  0 
B3 =  -B1  <  0 
1 +  cb-11+>  0  135=  -B  < 0 
=  13< 
B5  <  0 
B6 = B3  <  O 
B7 =  dB4 
g =  l  -  b-c(1-  1)>  0 
1+  cb-1>0 
To simplify  the notation,  I define  the (5 X 1) vector 
=  [B3 77,  B4 et,  B5 Ut, B6  kt, B7 ZJ. 
Defining  I as the 1 X 5 vector  [1, 1, 1, 1, 1],  (A.1) can be written  as 
(A.2)  Pt=Bo  Ept+Blmt+B2Eptl  +  +It. 
t.-1  t 
To derive  an expression  for Ept+,,  shift  equation  (A.2) forward  one period 
and take expectations  conditional  on information  available  at time t: 
(A.3)  Eptl  =  mB Etm+1  +  _2  Et+2  +  1  I Et+,. 
More generally,  for any  j  1, 
(A.4)  Ept+j  =  Em  +  Et+j+l +  I Et+j  1  I-Bo  t  I-Bt  I-ot 
Repeatedly  substituting  (A.4) into (A.3) yields  the following  expression  for 
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(A.5)  Ept+l  =  B1  _,  _-  Em  +  1  E  I E 
t  I  -Bo  j=i  t  I  -Bo  =tl  t 
where 
-c 
B2  1 +  cb-11 
I 
1-Bo  1  o 
or 
Here  I am imposing  the terminal  condition 
lim P-'  Fpt,? =  0, 
j-1x0  t 
which rules out speculative  bubbles. Equation (A.5) states that under 
rationality,  the currently  held  expectation  of the price  level  for next period 
depends  on current  expectations  about the whole future course of the 
money supply, as well as that of the vector ,,  which includes  as com- 
ponents U, E, t7, k, and Z. Notice that as long as b <  0, the parameter 8 is 
between  zero  and  unity,  which  permits  the infinite  sums  in (12)  to converge. 
To make  (A.5) operational,  I must  specify  how the expectations  of future 
m and ,  are formed.  I do this by positing  that m and ,  are governed  by 
autoregressive  processes  known  to the public,  and  that the public  properly 
takes into account  the nature  of those processes  in forecasting  the vari- 
ables. For example,  the money supply  is assumed  to be governed  by the 
known  feedback  rule 
00  00 
(A.6) 
Mt+1=  Z  wi  mt_  +  Z  Vi  /t-i  +  tmt+13 
i=O  i=O 
where  (mt  is a serially  uncorrelated  random  term  that is normally  distrib- 
uted with mean  zero, while the wis are fixed  parameters  and each vi is a 
1 X 5 vector  of parameters,  i =  0, . . .,  . The  random  variable  {m  denotes 
the component  of the money  supply  that cannot  be predicted  on the basis 
of past ms or ,us  (the part  perhaps  attributable  to discretion).  The (5 X 1) 
vector  ,  is assumed  to be governed  by the autoregressive  process 
co 
(A.7)  ssel =  N  Xi Pt-i  +  VJt+ll 
where each Xi is a diagonal (5 X 5) matrix of  parameters and VI,+,  is a Thomas  J. Sargent  467 
(5 X 1) vector of mutually  uncorrelated,  serially  uncorrelated,  normally 
distributed  random  variables  with means  zero. 
Given  (A.6) and  (A.7), Wold's "chain  rule of forecasting"'  can be used 
to give the expected  value of m,+,  for any  j, conditional  on information 
available  at t. These  forecasts  have the form 
(A.8)  Em,+  - 
wii mt_;  +  E2  Xii Pt-  M 
t  i-O0- 
where  the wjis  are  known  functions  of the wis  of (A.6),  and  the (1 X 5) Xjis 
are known  functions  of the vis  of (A.6) and the Xis of (A.7). 
Using (A.8), the first  term on the right side of equation  (A.5) becomes 
1-B E~  E  wii  m,_i  + E  Xii  Y,-i)  =  ; wi M-  s  +  E;  Vi 1-t-ii  1 -  Bo  j=1  \  t4  t=__0  i==0 
where 
Wi=  1 
- 
S8-lj  1-  Bo  j=l 
vi  I  -  B  E  j  ji,  a (1 X 5) matrix. 
Using this procedure,  equation  (A.5) can be rewritten  to express  Ept+l in 
terms  of current  and past values  of m, and  yi: 
(A.9)  Ept+l=  2  Wi  mt1i + E  Vi Ht-i  =  W*mt  +  V*yt, 
I  i=0  - 
where 
00 
W*mt  _  E  W;  mt,  and so on, 
and where  each P',  is a (1 X 5) matrix.  Here  the J7s  depend  on the param- 
eters of  the monetary "rule" (A.6), the parameters  of  autoregressive 
processes  that underlie  (A.7), and the parameters  of the economic  struc- 
ture,  equations  (1), (2), and  (3). The Wis  depend  both on the model's  struc- 
tural  parameters  and on the parameters  wi of the monetary  rule. 
This  expression  for Ept+,  can now be substituted  into equation  (A.2) to 
get the reduced  form  for the price  level: 
1. See Herman  0.  A. Wold (ed.), Econometric  Model  Building:  Essays on the Causal 
Chain  Approach  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 1964). 468  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
(A.10)  Pt =  Bo W*mt-i  +  Bo f*Mt-I +  B1 m, +  I Mt 
+  B2  W*m, +  B2  P'*Mt. 
Equation  (A.1O)  is the reduced  form  equation  that  appears  as equation  (11) 
in the text, while  equation  (A.9) corresponds  to the conditional  expecta- 
tion (13) in the text. 
APPENDIX  B 
Modifications  to the Model 
A More  Realistic  Portfolio  Sector 
BUILDING  IN  a more realistic  portfolio sector forces a modification  of 
the  proposition  that  the  real  rate  of interest  is independent  of the systematic 
part of the money  supply.  Suppose  the assumption  that bonds and equi- 
ties are  viewed  as perfect  substitutes  by owners  of wealth  were  abandoned 
and  replaced  by separate  demand  schedules  for equities  and  bonds  of vari- 
ous maturities,  perhaps  assuming  that the assets are gross substitutes.'  It 
would  then be standard  to assume  that the pertinent  interest  rate to enter 
in the aggregate  demand  schedule  is the yield on equities.2  The  real yields 
on all of the paper  assets  would  appear  in each  member  of the set of equa- 
tions describing  the conditions  for portfolio  balance-that is, equations 
expressing  equality  of the stock  demand  for each  paper  asset  with  the quan- 
tity of each  in existence.  In such  a system,  it remains  true  that  the real  yield 
on equities  that appears  in the aggregate  demand  schedule  is independent 
of the systematic  part  of the money  supply.  Systematic,  predictable  move- 
ments  in the money  supply  are thus not able to influence  the equity  yield, 
which  can be characterized  as the "critical"  yield  from  the point  of view  of 
affecting  aggregate  demand.3  However,  by conducting  debt management 
1. For example, see James Tobin, "A General  Equilibrium  Approach  to Monetary 
Theory,"  Journal  of Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  Vol. 1 (February  1969),  pp. 15-29. 
2. See ibid. Also see Franco  Modigliani  and Merton  H. Miller,  "The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation  Finance  and the Theory of Investment,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 
48 (June 1958),  pp. 261-97. 
3. See Tobin, "General  Equilibrium  Approach." Thomas  J. Sargent  469 
or open market operations,  the monetary  authority  can systematically 
influence  both the relationships  borne  by the yields  on other  paper  assets 
to the equity  yield  and the relationships  among  those other  yields.  In this 
way, debt  management  can have systematic  effects  on the yields  of certain 
assets,  whose  strength  depends  on the  extent  to which  wealth  owners  regard 
alternative  paper  assets  as good substitutes  for one another.  In such  a sys- 
tem,  debt  management  operations  might  well permit  the monetary  author- 
ity to peg the nominal  rate on, say, three-month  Treasury  bills. But that 
pegging  would  have  no persistent  effect  on the critical  yield  on equities  that 
governs  aggregate  demand.4 
It might  be useful  to consider  an additional  change  in the system  that 
would  further  modify  the second  proposition,  without,  I believe,  touching 
any of the policy implications  of the model. Assume  again the existence 
of various  paper  assets  that are imperfect  substitutes  for one another;  but 
abandon  the notion  that  the real  rate  of return  on one single  asset,  such  as 
the yield  on a certain  class  of equities,  is the one crucial  yield  that belongs 
in the aggregate  demand schedule,  and instead, assume that aggregate 
demand  depends  on the real  rates  of return  on all n assets,  so that,  instead 
of text equation  (2), the aggregate  demand  schedule  becomes 
n 
(2')  Yt k-  =  c rit + dZt  +  et, 
i=1 
where ci <  0 for all i, and rt  is the real rate of return on the ith paper asset. 
Define  an index  Pt  of real yields  as 
n  Ci 
=1  E  C 
Then  notice  that equation  (2') can be rewritten  as 
(2")  Yt-  =  (  )  )  +  dZt +  e'. 
4. The literature  on the term  structure  of interest  rates  has in large  part been devoted 
to attempting  to detect evidence  of imperfect  substitutability  among bonds of different 
maturities.  For example,  see Franco Modigliani  and Richard  Sutch,  "Debt Management 
and the Term  Structure  of Interest  Rates: An Empirical  Analysis  of Recent  Experience," 
Journal  of Political Economy,  Vol. 75 (August 1967), Pt. 2, pp.  569-89, and David 
Meiselman,  The Term  Structure  of Interest  Rates (Prentice-Hall,  1962). Very little con- 
vincing  evidence  has been assembled  that debt management  has important  effects  on the 
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In the system  that is formed  by replacing  (2) with  (2') and  replacing  (3) as 
before  with  a system  of portfolio  equilibrium  conditions  for a set of assets, 
it is easily  shown  that  the  real  yield  index  Pt  is independent  of the systematic 
part  of the money  supply.  Moreover,  this yield  index  certainly  qualifies  as 
the "crucial"  yield  affecting  aggregate  demand,  if anything  does. In such  a 
system,  debt management  policies  are able systematically  to affect  the re- 
lationships  among the real rates that are components  of Pt, but that is 
irrelevant  from  the point of view of affecting  Pt  and aggregate  output. 
The  Model  with  "Partly  Rational"  Expectations 
One  criticism  that  has been  made  of the kind  of model  presented  here  is 
that  it seems  to require  extraordinary  amounts  of wisdom  and  information 
on the part of those whose  expectations  are described  by equation  (13).5 
They are assumed  to act as if they know the probability  distribution  (12) 
and then use it together  with data on all of the conditioning  variables  to 
form their expectation  about next period's  price level. While assuming 
such a well-informed  public may or may not strain credulity,  the key 
aspects  of the theory  carry  through  even if the public is much less wise 
and knowledgeable. 
First, the orthogonality  of the public's  prediction  errors  to the set of 
variables  on which  its expectations  are  based  applies  when  the public  gets 
its knowledge  of the conditional  expectation  of pt+'  as if it were simply 
computing  a linear  least squares  regression  of the price level on lagged 
values  of the conditioning  variables  for the historical  data available.  The 
well-known  properties  of least squares  prediction  errors-in  particular, 
their  orthogonality  to the regressors  in the sample  period-will guarantee 
that the prediction  error  in the aggregate  supply  schedule  is uncorrelated 
with past values of the conditioning  variables.  That in turn implies  that 
y -  k will  be independent  of lagged  values  of those  conditioning  variables. 
Now to indicate  the minimal  amount  of information  and wisdom  that 
must  be imputed  to the public  in order  to preserve  the key policy  implica- 
tions of the model,  assume  for the moment  that in forming  its forecast  of 
the price level, the public has access to information  only about lagged 
5. For example, see James Tobin's discussion of  Lucas' paper in  Tobin's "The 
Wage-Price  Mechanism:  Overview  of the Conference,"  in Econometrics  of Price De- 
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prices  (and by implication  lagged  values  of its own forecasts).  The public 
again  is assumed  to put this information  together  in such a way as to ex- 
tract  the best (least  squares)  forecast  of Pt, so that 
tPt-l  = E(Pt I  Pt-li  Pt-2  *...  E[pt I  Olt-J, 
where  61t-j includes  only past  values  of pt.6  Taking  note of the fact that the 
variables  Pt-i  -  t- P*2  Pt-2-t-2Pt-3,  *  .  form a subset  of the variables 
in 01t-1 conditioning  the above  expectation,  I calculate  the regression  of the 
current  prediction  error  on past prediction  errors, 
E[(pt-tPA-1)  I  Pt-1 -  tPt*P-2,  Pt-2  -  t-2Pt-3,  * * j  = 0, 
which  establishes  that the prediction  errors  are serially  uncorrelated. 
Now combine  the above hypothesis  about expectations  formation  with 
the modified  aggregate  supply  hypothesis  (1'): 
Yt  -  kt =  y(Pt  -  Ept I  lt-)  +  i  Sj(yt-  kti)  +  Ut. 
Taking  expectations  conditional  on At-1,  I obtain 
E[Iv  -  kt) | a  y(Ept I at-, -  Ept I  Olt-,) 
+  jt  _j-  kt_j) +  E(Ut I Ut-1  Ut-2i  .  *. 
In general,  the term Ept  t-l -  Ept  I  Q,t-j  will not be zero: one obtains  a 
better  prediction  of pt by taking  into account  the components  of At-l  that 
are  excluded  from  O,t-,.  Consequently,  on the hypothesis  that the public's 
expectation  is conditioned  only on past  prices,  the forecast  error  Pt  -  Ept  I 
O6t-j that appears in the aggregate supply schedule is not in general in- 
dependent of the elements of at-l  that are excluded from OIt-l  In particular, 
the forecast  error  is generally  correlated  with past values of the money 
supply.  This means  that by choosing  the money  supply  rule (9) appropri- 
ately, the monetary  authority  can systematically  influence  the forecast 
errors  that appear  in the aggregate  supply  schedule.  The systematic  part 
of the money  supply  then  has  effects  on both  the rate  of output  and  the real 
rate  of interest,  so that  neither  of the two propositions  about  the neutrality 
of the systematic  part  of the money  supply  continues  to hold. 
6. Changing  the assumption  about j+1pi  in this way will itself change  the form of the 
probability  distribution  (12) that governs  pt+,, as can be seen easily by pursuing  the kind 
of calculations  reported  in Appendix  A. The arguments  of (12) would remain  the same, 
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But  the  potential  accomplishments  of stabilization  policy  are  still  severely 
circumscribed.  While  the monetary  authority  can have a systematic  effect 
on the prediction  errors  in the aggregate  supply  schedule,  there  exists no 
feedback  policy  that  is capable  of inducing  serial  correlation  in those  fore- 
cast errors.  So long as the forecasts  are conditioned  on at least lagged 
prices,  the errors  will be serially  uncorrelated.  The monetary  authority's 
ability  systematically  to affect  the public's  forecast  errors  then  comes  down 
to an ability  to affect  the variance  of those errors  without  being able to 
affect  their  mean  or serial  correlation  properties.  It follows  that there  are 
no feedback  rules  for the money  supply  and  fiscal  policy  variables  that can 
be expected  to produce  "runs"  of forecast  errors  that will in themselves 
be a source of persistent  movements  in output. Under the assumptions 
here, then, the monetary  and the fiscal authorities  still face no "cruel 
choice"  between  the average  rate of inflation  they shoot for and the ex- 
pected value of the unemployment  rate. But there remains  a nontrivial 
problem  in choosing  stabilization  policies,  for different  deterministic  feed- 
back rules  deliver  different  variances  for the public's  errors  in forecasting 
the price  level, and thereby  are associated  with different  variances  for the 
unemployment  rate. Comments  and 
Discussion 
David Fand: Thomas Sargent  has written a very stimulating  paper. It 
covers  complex  analytical  issues,  and I had to read  it a number  of times; 
but each time I read  it, I learned  some more. 
According  to Sargent,  the statistical  models applying  Fisher's  theory 
have generally  assumed  adaptive  expectations,  and have estimated  un- 
realistically  long lags.  Moreover,  they  require  a number  of special  assump- 
tions  about  the LM curve  or the IS curve,  which  make  the empirical  results 
hard  to take seriously. 
He therefore  offers  a different  kind of model, which  introduces  a par- 
ticular  kind of endogenous  expectations-so-called  rational  expectations. 
In such  a world,  Fisher's  theory  would  hold and so would  the natural  rate 
hypothesis.  Sargent  then  tests  the model  by trying  to reject  the natural  rate 
hypothesis;  since at least some of his tests do not reject  it, he infers  that 
Fisher's  theory  cannot  be dismissed. 
I would  like  to raise  a few  questions  about  the  paper,  more  in elaboration 
than  in criticism.  First,  Sargent's  model  salvages  Fisher's  theory,  but does 
not really  permit  a direct  test of it. Perhaps  it is possible  to obtain  an in- 
direct  test by using Sargent's  derived  measure  of expected  inflation.  Pre- 
sumably,  that could be subtracted  from the nominal  rate of interest,  and 
the resulting  series  on the real  rate  could be examined  to see whether  it is 
constant  or stable  or at least varies  plausibly  over time. 
Second,  I suspect  that  Sargent  exaggerates  the  dispute  between  those  who 
believe  that  the effect  of expected  inflation  on nominal  interest  rates  is im- 
mediate  and  those  who think  that  it will show  up fully  but only ultimately. 
I don't  think  that  is where  the key difference  lies. The  more  important  issue 
is between  those who think  the inflation  effect  on rates  occurs  within,  say, 
a year  and  those  who think  it takes  five  years  or more;  between  those who 
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think  it is fully  reflected  and those who think it need not ever  be fully re- 
flected  in nominal  interest  rates. 
I also wonder  how the model of rational  expectations  would  apply  in a 
variety  of situations  or different  types  of worlds.  For example,  is the public 
supposed  to view  a devaluation,  or a shift  from  fixed  to floating  rates,  as a 
change  in structure?  If so, doesn't that introduce  more possibilities?  As 
another  example,  how could this model be applied  to the kind of world 
James  Tobin described  in his presidential  address  to the American  Eco- 
nomic Association?  I would also have welcomed  an elaboration  of the 
effects of introducing  a real-balance  effect-a  matter  that Sargent  men- 
tions only briefly  in a footnote. Also, while Sargent's  model has several 
monetarist  implications,  it contrasts  with other  monetarist  models  in one 
respect,  since  they offer  a theory  of nominal  income  rather  than of real  in- 
come. That may be an important  distinction  and it deserves  some dis- 
cussion. 
My final  comments  concern  Sargent's  statistical  tests.  In his regressions, 
unemployment,  as an independent  variable,  is used  as a proxy  for the devia- 
tion of actual  output  from  trend  output.  With  due respect  for Okun's  law, 
I would note that the short-run  relationship  between  unemployment  and 
output  is not perfect,  and it would be interesting  to see whether  using a 
direct  measure  of the output  gap would  alter  the results  of Sargent's  tests. 
Also, Sargent  sets up one test with an autoregression  of order  3 in the un- 
employment  rate.  Then  he uses the "innovation"-that is, the error  in the 
autoregression-to try to explain  inflation.  The autoregression  of order  3 
seems  arbitrary;  it does not rest on the model which,  so far as I can see, 
points  only  to an autoregression  of order  1. Moreover,  once  an autoregres- 
sion of order  3 is used,  it will be very  hard  for the error  to explain  anything 
and very  difficult  for that term  to show the statistical  significance  that in 
turn  would  refute  the natural  rate hypothesis. 
Finally,  even after  Sargent's  ingenious  efforts,  I am not convinced  that 
Fisher's  theory  and  the natural  rate  hypothesis  are  an inseparable  package. 
I still think  there  is scope  for a paper  that tries  to test Fisher's  theory  sep- 
arately  and directly,  since  I think  more  people  would  be inclined  to accept 
the Fisher  theory  than the natural  rate  hypothesis. 
Stephen  Goldfeld:  I, too, learned  a lot from Sargent's  paper.  Essentially, 
he demonstrates  two kinds of propositions.  First, most previous  conven- 
tional  tests  of the Fisher  hypothesis  have  suffered  from  a number  of specifi- 
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world  of rational  expectations,  the Fisher  theory  can be reinterpreted  so 
that it does hold and the natural  rate  hypothesis  will also hold. 
The paper  contains  a very able technical  discussion  of the econometric 
problems  of testing  such a model. Indeed,  with its footnotes,  it is almost 
encyclopedic  in anticipating  the technical comments one would make 
about  the particular  tests Sargent  applies. 
I would  like to raise  three  kinds  of questions.  First, should  one believe 
the assumptions  underlying  the model?  And, if one modifies  them, how 
robust  are the theoretical  conclusions?  Second,  are the empirical  tests up 
to the high theoretical  standards  set for them,  and is the interpretation  of 
those  tests  acceptable?  Third,  what,  if anything,  does  the  paper  tell us about 
short-run  policy for the real world? 
With  respect  to the assumptions  underlying  the model,  I am puzzled  by 
several  features,  although  none  of the issues  seems  terribly  important.  Why 
does productive  capacity  (ks)  appear  in the demand  equation?  Why does 
the interest  rate  variable  appear  in linear  form,  when  all other  variables  are 
logarithmic?  Why is the income elasticity  of the demand  for money as- 
sumed  to be precisely  unity?  Does the absence  of a money supply  mech- 
anism  that  responds  to interest  rates  alter  the basic  story?  Similarly,  would 
the introduction  of a government  budget  constraint  change  the story?  I 
don't know whether  the presence  or absence  of these features  makes a 
difference  in this context,  but in some cases  it may. 
The heart of Sargent's  paper  is the model based on rational  expecta- 
tions, in which  the public  knows essentially  everything  about the models 
and monetary  policy follows a money  supply  rule. From that model Sar- 
gent derives  two principal  theoretical  conclusions:  (1) the unemployment 
rate is uninfluenced  by the money supply  rule, and (2) the expected  real 
rate of interest  is similarly  uninfluenced  by the money supply  rule. How 
robust  are these propositions  to the various  assumptions? 
As Sargent  recognizes,  the real interest  rate, or Fisher  proposition,  de- 
pends  critically  on the absence  of a real-balance  effect.  That  is an assump- 
tion about which tastes differ  among economists,  and its flavor is non- 
monetarist  in an otherwise  monetarist  type of model. More seriously,  it 
is very  strongly  restrictive  to assume  that  the public  really  knows  the model 
and  its parameters.  Sargent  sees a way  out of this tight  spot, however.  Un- 
der some assumptions,  the public  need merely  estimate  relevant  things  by 
making  an unbiased  forecast.  The expected  values  can be validly  replaced 
by their  least squares  forecasts.  But that validity  depends  on the linearity 
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softening  the assumption  of complete  knowledge  really  requires  adding  the 
assumption  of linearity.  Thus,  a number  of aspects  and assumptions  of the 
model are crucial,  even on a theoretical  level, to the conclusions  that the 
model generates.  And one may not find all those assumptions  congenial. 
As to the empirical  tests, basically  they consist of regressions  of the 
unemployment  rate on its own lagged  values and on a number  of other 
variables;  under  the maintained  natural  rate hypothesis,  the set of other 
variables  should  have no effect  on the unemployment  rate. The first  two 
tests  differ  in the choice  of variables  included  in the set that  is not supposed 
to influence  the unemployment  rate.  One  test-using just wages  and  prices 
-tends  to confirm  the natural  rate story. A second,  related,  test, with a 
longer  list of possible  explanatory  variables,  tends  to reject  the natural  rate 
hypothesis.  Instrumental  variables  are used to produce  another  pair of 
tests;  the third  test-using expected  and unexpected  price  movements-is 
consistent  with  the hypothesis,  while  the fourth,  using  wages,  rejects  it. 
Sargent  seems  to play  down  the implications  of his second  test, by stress- 
ing that the equation  that seems  to reject  the natural  rate  hypothesis  pro- 
vides  no comfort  to any alternative  theory  of aggregate  supply.  According 
to his argument,  any alternative  supply  theory  would impose  restrictions 
on the equation  he actually  estimates;  therefore,  the fit would  deteriorate 
and hence  the alternative  theory  would  not necessarily  do as well in terms 
of explanatory  power  as the equation  in the paper.  All of that  is true.  But  it 
has to be interpreted  with  several  caveats.  An alternative  theory  would  im- 
pose restrictions,  but it might  have  fewer  variables  and  hence  leave  a larger 
number  of degrees  of freedom.  The loss of explanatory  power  would not 
necessarily  mean  an alternative  theory  would  lose out. On the other  hand 
and  even  more  important,  an alternative  theory  might  introduce  new  varia- 
bles and thus might  make  the whole  game  different. 
On the tests  themselves,  I share  David  Fand's  concern  about  the number 
of lags included.  Basically,  the number  of lags should  reflect  the assumed 
specification  of the supply  side  of the economy.  No strong  justification  is- 
or probably  can be-offered for any particular  number  of lags. I am not 
sure  how that  affects  the tests.  For example,  Fand  conjectures  that  it would 
become  easier  to reject  the natural  rate  hypothesis  if no lags  or only one lag 
were included  in the unemployment  rate. I do not know what the right 
answer  is, but  I would  like  to know  the sensitivity  of that  test  to the number 
of unemployment  lags in the equation. 
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presence  of autocorrelation.  The appropriate  form of the test is slightly 
different  in that case. He actually  raises  the specter  of autocorrelation  in 
questioning  the validity  of the test that refutes  the natural  rate  hypothesis. 
It seems  appropriate  to examine  the effects  on the results  of estimating  an 
allowance  for autocorrelation  and of interacting  autocorrelation  and lags. 
Finally,  the tests presented  in the paper  are designed  as large  sample  tests 
and  yet they must be conducted  with a fairly  small  number  of time series 
observations. 
So, on balance,  it seems  to me that  the tests  are  not quite  as careful  or as 
widely  encompassing  in their  examination  of the sensitivity  of the results  as 
the standards  for testing  set forth  in the theoretical  discussion  of the paper. 
There  seems  to be a lot of room  for further  testing  along  those  lines,  within 
the spirit  of raising  the standards. 
The  third  set of questions  in my mind  relates  to the policy  implications. 
There are some obvious long-run  implications  if the natural  rate and 
Fisher  hypotheses  are right. But I have difficulty  assessing  the short-run 
implications.  A variety  of questions  arises.  For example,  how much  room 
is there,  even in this kind of world,  for policy strategies  to minimize  vari- 
ance? And how does that answer  depend  on various  parameters  of the 
model?  What  kind of short-run  dynamics  does this model  generate?  How 
are  rational  expectations  supposed  to be formed  in this world  if the govern- 
ment  imposes  an incomes  policy  (as well as a change  in exchange  rates  or 
rules,  such as Fand mentioned)? 
In general,  I would  have  been  happier  if some  of the questions  about  the 
short-run  implications  had been drawn  more  finely.  Nevertheless,  I found 
Sargent's  paper  quite  interesting  and provocative. 
General  Discussion 
James  Tobin probed  more deeply into the particular  assumptions  re- 
quired  to produce  the conclusions  of Sargent's  theoretical  model. He fo- 
cused  on a model of a simple  world  in which  money  and capital  were  the 
only  assets  and  in which  expectations  were  rational  and  money  was  neutral 
in the sense  that  doubling  the money  supply  would  merely  double  the price 
level  and  leave  all real  variables  unchanged.  Nonetheless,  if that economy 
was  observed  under  two situations-with the growth  rate  of money  zero  in 
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be the same  in the two. If in the second  situation  the price  level  rose by 10 
percent  a year  and everyone  expected  that, then the real return  on money 
would  be minus  10  percent,  and  the resulting  diminution  in the demand  for 
real cash balances  would encourage  capital  formation  and lower  the real 
rate of interest.  After some discussion,  Franco  Modigliani,  Sargent,  and 
Tobin  agreed  that  the Tobin  example  was  not "super-neutral"-that  is, the 
growth  rate of the money  supply  (although  not its level) would  affect  real 
magnitudes.  In a sense,  Tobin's  example  revealed  to the group  that super- 
neutrality  is a highly  restrictive  assumption. 
The nature  of the aggregate  supply  relationship  in Sargent's  model was 
subjected  to several  critical comments.  Modigliani  emphasized  the im- 
portance  of Sargent's  assumption  that output  differs  from its trend  value 
only because  suppliers  are "fooled"  about  prices.  That  assumption  assures 
that a model  will  have  a "natural"  rate  of unemployment-that  its long-run 
Phillips  curve  will be vertical.  Robert J. Gordon was very skeptical  that 
output fluctuations  in the real world could be linked to errors  in price 
predictions.  For seven  consecutive  years,  between  1958  and 1964,  output 
was below trend  (the unemployment  rate was above anyone's  estimate  of 
the natural  rate).  Gordon  thought  it highly  unlikely  that  prices  consistently 
ran below expected  prices  during  this period,  especially  since the actual 
price  level was creeping  up very  steadily.  Nor could he believe  that prices 
were lower than expected  in the 1970  recession,  when no economist  Mad 
predicted  price  increases  as large  as those  that  actually  occurred.  Respond- 
ing to Gordon,  William  Poole  noted  that  Sargent's  model  permitted  output 
adjustments  to be spread  out over  long periods  of time, and that the lags 
could produce  cyclical  patterns  and sustained  periods  of underutilization 
even when  price  anticipations  were  fully realized. 
Gordon  also felt that  the downward  inflexibility  of the overall  price  level 
made  a rational  expectations  model  inappropriate  in explaining  anticipated 
movements.  While  that  model  has  passed  a number  of statistical  tests  in the 
context  of commodity  and  security  markets,  upward  and  downward  move- 
ments  of prices  are  essentially  symmetrical  in those markets,  whereas  they 
are not symmetrical  for aggregate  price  behavior.  Richard  Freeman  ques- 
tioned Sargent's  justification  for the aggregate  supply  schedule:  that sup- 
pliers  sell more as a result  of higher  prices  because  they get information 
more  rapidly  about  the prices  of goods they sell than about  the aggregate 
price  level. Presumably  the relevant  comparison  would  be with items  they 
buy rather  than with any overall  index.  Freeman  saw no reason  to believe Thomas  J. Sargent  479 
that  people  or firms  take  more  time  to perceive  changes  in buying  prices  as 
opposed  to selling  prices. 
The  hypothesis  that  expectations  are  formed  rationally  was  also  discussed 
at some  length.  Thomas  Juster  stressed  the cost of forming  good expecta- 
tions. Different  types of economic agents have different  incentives  that 
determine  how  much  effort  and  expense  to put  into  the formulation  of fore- 
casts. To Juster,  it seemed  plausible  that a small class of actors on the 
economic  scene  would  behave  in accordance  with  the rational  expectations 
model,  but he doubted  that  this class  would  include  most business  firms  or 
virtually  any households.  Arthur  Okun  suggested  that the issue might  be 
whether  enough participants  had the incentive  to arbitrage  to make ra- 
tionality  dominate  in markets.  Gordon noted that even the forecasts  of 
experts  do not seem to be unbiased  and serially  uncorrelated  in the way 
that Sargent's  model  requires.  For example,  economists  consistently  under- 
predicted  prices  for years  after  the Second  World  War;  similarly,  business- 
men's  errors  in anticipations  of their  own investments  display  a clear  cycli- 
cal pattern. 
Poole felt, however,  that the rational  expectations  model was a major 
improvement  over the highly  subjective  initial Keynesian  formulation  of 
expectations  and the subsequent  model of adaptive  expectations  that as- 
sumes  that  views  of the future  are  formed  purely  by naive  inspection  of the 
past. He urged Sargent  to take explicit account of the accumulation  of 
knowledge.  Rational  expectations  mean  that  the public  makes  use of all the 
information  and  knowledge  available  at any  one moment.  But  the amounts 
change  over  time. People  could  not have  predicted  economic  variables  the 
way  they  now do back  at the turn  of the century,  any  more  than  the Wright 
brothers  could  have  flown  to the moon. Accordingly,  Poole  raised  the pos- 
sibility  that the policy makers  may have more rapid  access  to knowledge 
and fuller information  about some aspects  of the economy than would 
private  economic  agents.  Hence,  under  some circumstances,  they may be 
able to take actions  that benefit  the nation. 
Modigliani  agreed  with Fand's conjecture  that the Fisher  proposition 
might  hold in a world  that did not conform  to the hypothesis  of a natural 
unemployment  rate. He pointed out that the FRB-MIT-Penn  (FMP) 
econometric  model  maintains  the Fisher  proposition  in the long run,  while 
it contains  a long-run  Phillips  curve  that  is not vertical.  He emphasized  that 
some tradeoff  between  inflation  and unemployment  could persist  in the 
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vacancies  and other  features  that depart  from pure  market  clearing.  Mo- 
digliani  also suggested  that,  if it takes  a very  long  time  for  the Phillips  curve 
to become  vertical,  then  the natural  rate  hypothesis  may  be  just an intellec- 
tual curiosity.  Sargent  took issue  with that view;  he insisted  that, whether 
it was right or wrong, the long-run  natural rate thesis has immediate 
relevance  because  it says  something  important  about  the impact  of system- 
atic and predictable  changes  on the economic  system. 
A number  of participants  focused  on Sargent's  empirical  work. Modi- 
gliani  wondered  whether  Sargent's  tests were  capable  of distinguishing  be- 
tween a Phillips  curve  that was truly vertical  and one that became  very 
steep  after  a moderate  period.  Gordon  suspected  that the particular  wage 
index  used  by Sargent  might  cause  problems  since  it was not corrected  for 
interindustry  shifts  and hence  tended  to drop  more  during  recessions  than 
would  a more  accurately  weighted  wage  measure.  Poole  found  it interesting 
to compare  Sargent's  empirical  findings  with those in a 1972 article  by 
Charles  Nelson.' Nelson had evaluated  the predictive  performance  of the 
FMP model  against  that  of a simple  autoregressive  scheme,  and  found  that 
the autoregressive  model was better  for estimating  unemployment  but in- 
ferior in tracking  prices.  Those findings  accord  with the implications  of 
Sargent's  model that structural  variables  should help to improve  predic- 
tions of prices  but not of unemployment. 
Sargent  responded  to Fand's  question  about  why his measure  of the ex- 
pected  inflation  rate should not be subtracted  from observed  short-term 
nominal  rates  of interest  to derive  an estimate  of the real rate of interest 
over time. Sargent  argued  that this procedure  would be valid only if the 
expected  inflation  rate had been derived  from a complete econometric 
model.  Moreover,  Sargent  doubted  that such  measures  of real  rates  of in- 
terest  could  answer  any  relevant  questions  about  the world  that would  not 
be illuminated  by the market  yields on equities  or other real assets. But 
Modigliani  and Alan Greenspan  cautioned  that observations  of the stock 
market  do not provide  a meaningful  estimate  of the expected  rate  of return 
on equities.  Greenspan  felt  that  an  interest  rate  series  corrected  for  expected 
inflation  would  provide  valuable  information  to the economic  analyst. 
1. Charles  R. Nelson, "The Prediction  Performance  of the FRB-MIT-Penn  Model 
of the U.S. Economy,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 62 (December  1972),  pp. 902-17. 